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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Experience of the March 11 2011, Great Tohoku earthquake clearly demonstrated that the 
earthquakes might be the dominating contributors to the overall risk of nuclear power 
plants (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [INPO], 2011); International Atomic Energy 
Agency [IAEA], 2007). The seismic probabilistic safety assessments of several nuclear power 
plants also provided similar results. On the other hand, experiences show that plants 
survive much larger earthquakes than those considered in the design base, as it was the case 
of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, where the safety classified structures, systems and 
components survived the Niigata-Chuetsu-Oki earthquake in 2007 without damage and loss 
of function (IAEA, 2007). In spite of the nuclear catastrophe of the Fukushima Daiichi plant 
caused by the tsunami after Great Tohoku earthquake 11th of March 2011, the behaviour of 
thirteen nuclear unit in the impacted area on the East-shore of the Honshu Island 
demonstrated high earthquake resistance. Consequently, proper understanding and 
assessment of the safety for the case earthquake (and generally for the external hazards) is 
very important for the operating nuclear power plants.  
For the operating plants basic questions to be answered are, whether the nuclear power 
plant (NPP) is safe enough within the design basis and whether the operation can be 
continued safely if an earthquake hits the plant.  
The designer and operators were mainly focusing on the first question, i.e. whether the 
reactor can be shut down, cooled-down, the residual heat can be removed from the core and 
spent-fuel stored at the plant, and the radioactive releases can be limited below the 
acceptable level in case of an earthquake. The second question became important especially 
after series of events when large nuclear capacities were shutdown for assessment of plant 
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post-earthquake condition and justification of safety before their restart (Onagawa NPP in 
2005, Shika NPP in 2007, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP in 2007, Hamaoka NPP in 2009). 
Obviously, there is a need for reliable justification of plant safe status after felt earthquake 
for avoiding long shutdown time and consequent economic losses. Recently, the importance 
of the rapid assessment of the post-event plant status became very important from the point 
of view of the emergency management. This is one of the lessons learnt from the stress tests 
of nuclear operators following the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. 
Operators of nuclear power plants worldwide performed seismic re-evaluation and 
upgrading programmes of nuclear power plants during last three decades. A summary of 
international effort is given e.g. in (Campbell, et al, 1988; Gürpinar & Godoy, 1998) and in 
the special report issued by Nuclear Energy Agency, thereafter NEA, (NEA, 1998). The re-
evaluation and upgrading of the seismic safety of the operating nuclear power plants were 
motivated mainly by the changing understanding of the seismic hazard at plant sites and/or 
recognition of inadequacy of design and/or qualification of certain safety related systems, 
structures and components relative to the seismic hazard or state-of-the-art of the technique 
and the requirements. In some countries, the existence of necessary margins with respect to 
the beyond design base earthquakes and avoidance of the cliff edge effects have to be 
demonstrated. The scope of the seismic re-qualification and upgrading programmes 
includes the definition of the pre-earthquake preparedness and post-earthquake actions at 
the plants. 
All operating nuclear power plants in the United States are conducting an Individual Plant 
Examination of External Events, including earthquakes beyond the design basis, and about 
two-thirds of the operating plants are conducting parallel programs for verifying the seismic 
adequacy of equipment for the design basis earthquake; see (Campbell, et al, 1988). Western 
European countries also performed some re-evaluation of their older nuclear power plants 
for seismic events (NEA, 1998). Most extensive programmes have been performed in 
Eastern-European countries, where the operators implemented comprehensive programmes 
for evaluating and upgrading the seismic safety of their operating nuclear power plants 
(Gürpinar and Godoy, 1998; IAEA, 1995, 2000). Seismic re-qualification has been performed 
at following VVER plants: 
- NPP Paks, Hungary VVER 440-213, 4 units 
- NPP Mochovce, Slovakia VVER 440-213, 2 units 
- NPP V2 Bohunice, Slovakia VVER 440-213, 2 units 
- NPP Dukovany, Czech Republic VVER 440-213, 4 units 
- NPP Medzamor, Armenia, VVER 440(specific design) 1 unit 
- NPP Temelin, Czech Republic, VVER-1000, 2 units 
- NPP Kozloduy Unit 5 and 6, Bulgaria, VVER-1000, 2 units 
The scope of seismic safety programmes at VVER-440/213 plants was the most extensive. 
It includes the re-evaluation of the hazard, reinforcement of structures and components, 
qualification of the active equipment, installation of seismic instrumentation and 
development of appropriate procedures. The seismic safety programme implemented at 
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Paks NPP was one of the most complex one. The implementation of measures was 
completed in 2003. Therefore the peculiarities of the programme, its scope and the 
applied methodologies could not be properly addressed and interpreted in the 
referenced above review papers. Originally the Paks NPP has not been designed and 
qualified for the earthquake loads. The seismic safety programme at Paks NPP has 
therefore aimed at design basis reconstitution. The re-evaluation of site seismic hazard 
included all required geological, geophysical, seismological and geotechnical 
investigations. The seismic design basis had been newly defined. Formally the 
compliance with design basis requirements has to be ensured by design methods and 
standards. It was already recognised that a consequent and full scope re-design in line 
with design codes and standards and subsequent upgrading might be impossible at Paks 
NPP. It should be recognised that use of methodologies developed for the justification of 
the seismic safety of operating plants does not ensure the compliance with design basis 
requirements and cannot be directly applied for VVER plants. The qualification of the 
nuclear power plant have been executed for the newly defined design basis earthquake 
by applying procedures and criteria for the design, combined with the methods and 
techniques developed for seismic re-evaluation of operating nuclear power plants. The 
selection and use of methodologies has been graded in accordance with safety and 
seismic classification of the SSCs. After implementing the measures for design basis 
reconstitution, the achieved level of safety has been quantified via seismic PSA, which 
provides the core damage frequency. 
The question of the safe continuation of operation became very important as the World 
largest Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant was shutdown for long-term after Niigata-Chuetsu-Oki 
earthquake in 2007 that caused a 0.67g ground motion acceleration at the site (value 
measured at the Unit 1 base mat). The safety classified SSCs designed for PGA 0.27g 
survived the earthquake without damage and loss of function while the non-safety 
structures were heavily damaged. The justification of the safety took two years.  
The decision on the continuation of the operation is rather simple if the earthquake does 
not exceed the operational base (OBE) level. The case becomes more difficult if the OBE-
level is exceeded and there are obvious damages in place. The justification of operability 
is even more complex if the earthquake loads exceed the design base level and there are 
no obvious failures/damages as it happened at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant. 
Obviously, the judgement on the continuation of operation should be based on the set of 
information regarding capability of SSCs to survive an earthquake and on the post-event 
inspections, tests and analyses. It would be very reasonable to have in advance an 
assessment method for the plant status to ensure the effectiveness of the post-earthquake 
walk-downs and other actions, and to limit the time of shutdown. The methods for 
judgement on the safe continuation of operation can be developed on the basis of the 
design information. The results of the seismic probabilistic safety analysis (seismic PSA) 
or margin assessment provide useful additional information regarding weak-links. The 
design provides deterministic type information that no failure or damage should be 
expected if the earthquake loads do not exceed the design base level. However, the 
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probability of damage is not zero even if the loads are less than the design base one. The 
seismic PSA provides the core damage frequency as the output of the analysis, which is a 
measure of the seismic safety. The PSA is generally failure oriented. The seismic PSA 
shows the weak links. This knowledge can be very useful for the planning of the post-
event inspections. Similar information is provided by the seismic margin analysis, which 
quantifies the capability of the plant to survive an event greater than the design basis 
one.  
After the severe accident at Fukushima NPP the operators in European Union, U.S. and 
some other countries including Japan performed comprehensive safety and risk evaluation 
of operating nuclear power plants, see e.g. (European Commission, 2011). These 
tests/reviews will launch different re-evaluation and upgrading programmes with regard to 
seismic safety and for improvement of the capability to cope with the beyond design base 
earthquake and associated events (fire, flood) at the existing plants. This process includes at 
some sites the re-assessment of the site hazard motivated by recent events and/or new 
scientific evidences, for example in the U.S. (NRC, 2011). These lessons learned will also 
affect the projects under preparation and/or implementation. For the new plants, it has to be 
demonstrated that the plant has sufficient margins with respect to the design basis extension 
earthquake loads of and avoiding the cliff-edge effect. Consequently, the lessons learned 
from the former projects for evaluation of the seismic safety and upgrading of operating 
plants are still of great practical importance.  
1.2. Objective of the Chapter 
Objective of the recent Chapter is to provide practical insights to the re-evaluation and 
upgrading of seismic safety of operating plants. 
Evaluation of seismic safety and re-qualification of operating plants require specific 
approach; the safety goals have to be ensured in reasonable manner, avoiding unnecessary 
conservatism, contrary to the design that is ab’ovo conservative. State-of-the-art 
methodologies have to be implemented in every aspect of the re-evaluation and upgrading 
process. The optimisation of the measures from logistics point of view is very important 
under the condition of an operating plant.  
International Atomic Energy Agency developed a comprehensive Safety Guide on 
“Evaluation of Seismic Safety for Existing Nuclear Installations” (IAEA, 2009a). The 
supporting document of this Guide is the Safety Report Series No 28 on “Seismic Evaluation 
of Existing Nuclear Power Plants” (IAEA, 2003) that summarises the before 2003 experience 
in the seismic evaluation and upgrading of the operating plants. These documents focus 
mainly on the methodologies for seismic safety evaluation that do not involve a change in 
the design basis earthquake.  
In this Chapter the case of seismic evaluation and upgrading methodologies and solutions 
are presented. The Chapter includes the case for upgrading of an operating nuclear power 
plant originally not designed for earthquake. Based on the graded approach, the feasibility 
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of the application of seismic design methods combined with those developed for the re-
evaluation of existing plants is demonstrated.  
New areas of the seismic safety evaluation of operating plants are also addressed in the 
Chapter that were triggered by recent events, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant and the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, that are focusing on the assessment and assurance of the beyond 
design base capability of the nuclear power plants, periodic review of safety, etc.  
1.3. Scope of the Chapter 
Scope of the Chapter covers  
- the basic principles for ensuring the seismic safety of nuclear power plants,  
- typical cases of the re-evaluation and re-qualification programmes, including cases of 
design basis reconstitution and studies for restart after an earthquake as well as the 
evaluation of the beyond design base capabilities of the plants, 
- the applicable re-evaluation methodologies, 
- the most important aspects of the pre-earthquake preparedness and post-earthquake 
actions, 
- the full scope implementation example, 
- the aspects of maintaining the seismic qualification during operation and periodic 
safety review. 
1.4. Structure of the Chapter 
Section 2 of this Chapter defines the basic principles of seismic safety. Section 3 provides an 
overview of the methodologies applicable: Section 3.1 outlines the objective and scope of the 
seismic safety programmes. Section 3.2 provides an overview of applicable methodologies. 
Sections 3.3 address the issues of restart after earthquake. Section 3.4 outlines the questions 
of accident management. Sections 3.5 to 3.7 address the walk-down, design of upgrading 
and role of the peer-review. Section 4 is devoted to the pre-earthquake preparedness and 
post-earthquake actions. The practical and full scope example of seismic re-evaluation and 
upgrading is shown in Section 5. Section 6 and 7 are related to the maintenance of the 
seismic qualification during operation and periodic safety reviews. Extensive list of 
references is provided to the Chapter in Section 8. 
2. Basic principles of seismic safety 
The fundamental safety objective of design and operation of nuclear power plant is to 
protect human life and environment in case of any malfunctions, failures of the plant 
systems, structures and components which may occur during the plant lifetime including 
those caused by rarely occurring earthquakes. The generic approach for ensuring this safety 
objective is the application of the concept of the defence in depth. In accordance with this 
concept, the following requirements are applicable:  
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1. Inherent and/or engineered safety features, safety systems and procedures have to be in 
place for the case of earthquakes 
a. for leading the plant to a safe shutdown state, i.e.  
- for the maintaining the sub-criticality in the reactor and spent fuel pool and, 
- for the cool down and heat removal from the core and spent fuel; 
b. for maintaining at least one protection barrier to ensure that the radiological 
consequences would be below the required limits. 
2. Means, plans and procedures have to be in place for on-site and off-site emergency 
response to mitigate the consequences of accidents that result from failure of safety 
features and accident management measures in case of severe earthquakes.  
The seismic safety is ensured by the following complex activities: 
1. Site investigations and evaluation of the site seismic hazard, including hazards caused 
by the earthquake, like soil liquefaction;  
2. Definition of the characteristics of the design basis earthquake; 
3. Adequate design; 
4. Use of qualified components;  
5. Installation of seismic instrumentation; 
6. Development of accident-prevention and accident-management procedures; 
7. Evaluation of safety; 
8. Seismic housekeeping; 
9. Periodic safety assessment and subsequent upgrading if needed. 
The basic safety functions, i.e. shut down, cooling and containment, have to be maintained 
for the earthquakes within the design basis envelope and with some extent for the severe 
beyond design basis earthquakes. 
Traditionally the design of the nuclear facilities adapted the two-level concept: design for 
safety, using a high-level seismic excitation for design basis and design for production, 
using a moderate level of seismic excitation for operational limit.  
The design base earthquake has to be defined with quite low probability of exceedance 
during operating time. This earthquake is the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) as per U.S. 
terminology; see U.S. NRC 10CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization 
Facilities (NRC, 1956). It is called Sicherheitserdbeben, i.e. safety earthquake in German 
Nuclear Safety Standards 2101 (Kerntechnische Ausschuss [KTA], 1990), it is the maximum 
design earthquake (MRZ) according to the Russian-Soviet terminology and it is called SL-2 
earthquake level by the IAEA guideline NS-G-1.6 (IAEA, 2003b) [4]. Here the term of Design 
Base Earthquake (DBE) will be used. According to the international practice the annual 
probability of exceedance of the DBE is usually 10-4/year in case of nuclear power plants. The 
lower limit of the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the DBE is set for 0.1g regardless of the 
site (article 2.7 of NS-G-1.6). The shutdown and cool-down of the reactor, the continuous 
heat removal from the irradiated fuel (in the reactor core and spent fuel pool), and the 
limitation of releases have to be ensured in this limit state. SSCs required for basic safety 
function have to sustain the earthquake loads without loss of function.  
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Operability of NPPs should be ensured after the moderately frequent and not severe 
earthquakes. The operational base earthquake (OBE or SL-1 level according to the IAEA 
terminology) level is defined as a design level for continuous operation. The OBE was 
usually defined as an event with frequency of 10-2/a, or a ground motion with maximum 
horizontal acceleration equal to a given fraction of the maximum acceleration value of the 
SSE. Through the years the concept of designing for two earthquakes has radically changed. 
Nowadays, the OBE is interpreted as an operational limit and inspection level rather than an 
obligatory design level. The definition of the OBE level is subject of design, operational, 
economic considerations; see the IAEA NS-G-3.3 Safety Guide (IAEA, 2002). Design for 
lower level is not required if the OBE PGA is equal or less than 1/3rd of the SSE PGA, see in 
Appendix S of the 10 CFR Part 50. Instead of OBE PGA, new criteria for the exceedance of 
operational limit/inspection level are introduced. The changes of the terminology in the 
German regulation demonstrate the changes in design concept: the former terms SSE - 
Sicherheitserdbeben and OBE - Auslegungserdbeben were replaced by the terms design base 
earthquake and inspections earthquake, i.e. Bemessungserdbeben and Inspektionserdbeben. 
3. Tasks for seismic re-evaluation and upgrading of operating NPPs 
Major tasks of the seismic re-evaluation and upgrading projects are  
- identification of the objective and scope of the programme 
- selection of the methods for the re-evaluation, including definition of the seismic input 
for the analyses and performance of the analyses 
- design/development and implementation of modifications and re-qualification 
measures 
- evaluation of the achieved safety level, calculation of the core damage frequency due to 
earthquake. 
The tasks are determined by the objective of the project as it has been shown above, i.e. 
resolution of qualification issues, ensuring the design basis compliance, etc. 
3.1. Objective and scope of the seismic safety programmes 
Generic objective of the seismic safety programmes is to ensure the basic nuclear safety 
functions, i.e.  
- the control of the reactivity in the reactor and spent fuel pool, i.e. the ability to 
shutdown the reactor and maintain the sub-criticality after the earthquake, 
- to cool down and heat removal from the core and spent fuel, 
- to maintain the containment function for the reactor and spent fuel, i.e. limit the release 
of radioactive substances into the environment. 
The functions have to be maintained for the earthquakes within the design basis 
envelope and with some extent for the earthquakes with parameters exceeding the 
design basis one.  
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The basic concept of the seismic safety re-evaluation and of the operating nuclear power 
plants, and the selection of the methods and criteria is different from that are required in 
case of the design of new power plants; see the INSAG-8 document “A Common Basis for 
Judging the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants Built to Earlier Standards” (IAEA, 1995).  
The graded approach is used while ensuring the seismic safety of NPPs, i.e. the safety 
importance of the SSCs is considered and according to this the SSCs are classified into seismic 
safety classes, which define the requirements assigned to the design, qualification and operation 
of the SSCs. Well-defined set of plant systems and structures and components are required to be 
functional during and after the earthquake for bringing the plant in-to stable shutdown 
condition. Some of those SSCs are passive, e.g. the pressure retaining boundaries or the 
containment. They shall sustain the vibratory load remaining leak-tight; however some plastic 
deformation, ductile behaviour might be allowed. In some cases the deformation has to be 
limited to the elastic for ensuring some active functions. Building structures and equipment 
supporting structures might be also loaded to plastic region up-to the level, which does not 
impair the intended safety functions. The active systems functionality requires qualification for 
the vibratory motion as well as availability of supporting functions, e.g. electrical power supply. 
Practically, a conscious and careful evaluation and utilisation of the built-in margins provide 
the possibility for achieving the target safety level at operating plants by feasible amount of 
modifications and re-qualifications. 
The scope and the methodology of the seismic safety programmes vary with the motivation 
of the particular project. Practically there have been three different objectives of the past 
seismic safety programmes: 
1. to resolve the inadequacy of the design and qualification while the seismic design basis 
remains unchanged, i.e. to comply with the current licensing basis;  
2. to comply with newly defined seismic design basis (modification of design basis either 
because of new scientific evidences regarding seismic hazard or because of changing 
regulations);  
3. to evaluate and demonstrate the seismic margin. 
The objective and scope of recent seismic safety re-evaluation programmes is to demonstrate 
the plant safety for the design base extension, to justify the re-start after strong earthquake, 
and to identify the plant vulnerability in case of severe event and develop adequate accident 
management provisions. 
3.1.1. Resolving the inadequacy issues 
Example for the first type of seismic safety programme is the resolution of USI A-46 seismic 
issues of older, operating nuclear power plants in the U.S. (NRC, 1987). This programme was 
aimed to demonstrate the seismic adequacy of essential equipment at older operating plants 
by the use of available seismic experience data for similar equipment. The rules for the 
resolution of the USI A-46 issues are defined in the Generic Implementation Procedure, 
thereafter GIP, developed for Seismic Qualification Utility Group [SQUG] (SQUG, 1992). The 
 
Seismic Safety Analysis and Upgrading of Operating Nuclear Power Plants 
 
85 
scope of the programme was limited to the equipment needed for the safe shutdown of the 
reactor after a design basis earthquake and bringing the plant to a stable hot or cold shutdown 
condition for as minimum 72 hours of time. A single shutdown path and a backup for decay 
heat removal were defined. The seismic input used for the qualification was set to the SSE and 
the design floor response spectra. The core of the GIP is the empirical qualification method and 
database. The GIP was applied in several countries, e.g. U.K. and Belgium.  
3.1.2. Seismic margin programmes 
It is important to demonstrate on one hand that the nuclear power plant will remain safe in 
case of an earthquake that exceeds the design base level, whether the basic safety functions 
can be lost due to sudden failure (i.e. ‘cliff-edge’ effect). On the other hand it is important to 
know the contribution of the seismic hazard to the plant core damage frequency. Example 
for margin assessment and quantification of the seismic safety in terms of core damage 
frequency is the NRC initiated Individual Plant Examination of External Events, thereafter 
IPEEE in the U.S. (NRC, 1991). There are three methods for the margin assessment: the 
seismic PSA, and margin assessment using either the deterministic method developed by 
EPRI or the probabilistic method developed by the NRC. In this case of deterministic 
method a reference level earthquake is selected for which – under certain assumptions – the 
capacity has to be demonstrated. The scope of SSCs considered in the margin assessment 
depends on the method selected, e.g. in case of seismic PSA the scope of SSCs is identical to 
the Level 1 PSA plus the containment. 
3.1.3. Reconstituting the design basis 
The most demanding programmes were those for ensuring the compliance with newly 
defined design basis.  
These programmes include the following tasks:  
1. Evaluation of the seismic hazard of the site that includes the associated with earthquake 
events, e.g. liquefaction; 
2. Development of the design basis earthquake characteristics; 
3. Identification of the structures, systems and equipment, which are needed for ensuring 
that basic safety functions; 
4. Evaluation of the seismic capacity of SSCs and identification of the upgrading; 
5. Design and implementation of the necessary corrective measures; 
6. Installation of seismic instrumentation;  
7. Development of pre-earthquake preparedness and post-earthquake measures; 
8. Evaluation of the safety, i.e. quantification of the core damage frequency due to 
earthquake, quantification of the safety margins. 
Depending on the case and the national regulation, the scope of the design base 
reconstitution programme can cover either all SSCs classified into seismic and safety classes 
as per new design, or the scope is limited 
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bringing the reactor into stable (hot or cold) shutdown condition. Those non-safety classified 
SSCs have to be also considered damage/failure of which can disable certain safety functions 
due to seismic interactions (falling down, flooding, fire).  
3.1.4. Recent beyond design base studies 
The quantification of the margins has three aspects:  
- it is part of the design, 
- it is needed while evaluating the plant condition and justifying the restart after a strong 
earthquake hit the plant,  
- it is needed for the development of the severe accident management provisions.  
According to the IAEA design requirements NS-R-1 (IAEA, 2000), the seismic design of the 
plant shall provide for a sufficient safety margin to protect against seismic events. This means that 
the abrupt lost of function has to be excluded by the design even if the earthquake demand 
exceed the design base one (see also NS-R-1.6 paragraph 2.39 regarding ‘cliff-edge’ effect).  
According to the novel requirements, the capability of the new plants to withstand the loads 
and conditions of the design basis extension has to be ensured by the design provisions. In case 
of new plants, a minimum configuration of SSCs for ensuring the shutdown and subcriticality 
of the reactor, heat removal to the ultimate heat sink and the containment have to remain 
functional for the accident management purposes. A margin type evaluation has to be 
performed for demonstration the beyond design base capabilities of the new plants (1.4 times 
the SSE loads as per EUR requirements and 1.67 times of the SSE loads in the U.S. practice). Best 
estimate methods can be used for the justification beyond design base capabilities.  
The plant safety re-assessment after a strong earthquake requires an overall checking the 
post-event condition of all SSCs, even those non-safety classified SSCs, since both the safety 
and operability have to be demonstrated. The possible analysis and testing/inspection 
methods should be selected and applied in accordance with safety relevance and impact on 
the operation (Nomoto, 2000). According to (Kassawara, 2008), the probabilistic margin 
analysis can also be effective in this case.  
Recently, the availability of severe accident management provisions become of great 
importance. The scope of stress tests covers review of compliance with design base 
requirements, demonstration of beyond design base capacity (avoidance of the cliff-edge 
effect) and identification of plant vulnerability/damage state and development of severe 
accident management measures and guidelines. Generally, some margin type analyses have 
been performed in the participating countries for the possible minimum configurations 
needed for shutdown and heat removal of the reactor and spent fuel and protection of the 
containment. Identification of seismic interactions (fires, flooding, logistical obstacles) 
became important since these can affect the function of the SSCs within the minimum 
configuration, inhibit the connections of provisory power and cooling lines, impeding the 
implementation of Severe Accident Management/mitigation measures as it is to see in the 
country reports at the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group site (ENSREG, 2012). 
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3.2. Methodologies for re-evaluation of seismic safety 
The methodologies for the seismic re-evaluation and re-qualification are as follows: 
1. Qualification by empirical methods 
2. Quantification of margins: 
a. Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment (NRC, 1983)  
b. NRC Seismic Margins Method (Budnitz et al., 1985; Prassinos et al., 1986)  
c. Electric Power Research Institute Seismic Margins Method (EPRI, 1988) 
3. Design methods – justification by analysis 
3.2.1. Qualification by empirical method 
Empirical qualification of the plant equipment is a powerful tool for seismic re-qualification 
of operating NPPs. The empirical qualification methods have been recognised by IAEA in 
the Safety Guides NS-G-1.6 as well as NS-G-2.13.  
The empirical qualification database developed for SQUG covers twenty classes of equipment, 
e.g. active equipment as well as cable raceways, tanks and heat exchangers (SQUG, 1992; 
Starck&Thomas, 1990), except of pipelines and structures. As an alternative solution, the U.S. 
Department of Energy [DoE] has developed the Seismic Evaluation Procedures, a procedure 
similar to GIP that also covers pipelines and ventilation ducts (DoE, 1997).  
The steps of the Generic Implementation Procedure are as follows (SQUG, 1992): 
- Development of safe shutdown equipment list 
- Development of seismic demand (in-structure response) 
- Equipment walk-down and screening 
- Relay evaluation 
- Outlier resolution 
- Reporting 
The methodology and the database (the so called SQUG-database) can be adapted to the 
needs of different programmes for the resolution of design/qualification inadequacy issues.  
Generally the process has to be started with development of the list of SSCs requiring re-
qualification for a given level of earthquake. The basis of the identification of the scope can 
be the list of SSCs for safe shutdown or the seismic and/or safety classification database as it 
was the case at Paks NPP.  
Four criteria are used for the verification of seismic capacity: (1) Comparison of the seismic 
demand to the SQUG bounding spectrum; (2) Checking in the experience database (caveats 
and inclusion rules); (3) Checking the anchorage; (4) Evaluation of the seismic interactions.  
The seismic demand can be defined either by design floor response spectra, or by scaling-up 
the design floor response spectra to the required level, or by completely new response 
calculation for the required input (e.g. at Paks NPP the floor response spectra have been 
calculated for the newly defined DBE).  
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In case of most of this equipment, the load-bearing capacity is verified by demonstrating 
that the equipment is adequately anchored. Operability is demonstrated by verifying that 
the equipment is similar to the equipment of the database created on the basis of experience 
and that it meets all of the prescriptions included in the GIP.  
Important element of the procedure is the walk-down that provides the basis for screening out 
the obviously rugged items and for the consideration of the as built conditions, since in majority 
of cases, the load-bearing capacity is ensured, if the equipment is adequately anchored.  
The applicability of the empirical qualification method should be carefully checked via 
reviewing the similarities between the features of the items in the database and item to be 
qualified at the plant. The empirical method and database were adapted for the qualification 
of the VVER equipment (Masopust, 2003) and used for the qualification of the VVER at Paks 
NPP Hungary, Bochunice and Mochovce NPP in Slovakia, though the objective and scope of 
the particular seismic safety programmes differed very much from those in the USI A-46.  
3.2.2. Deterministic margin analysis 
The plant design shall ensure sufficient margins against seismic demand, as it is required by 
the IAEA design requirements NS-R-1 (IAEA, 2000).  
In case of operating plants, the objective of the seismic margin assessment (SMA) is to 
evaluate, quantify the inbuilt seismic margin of those structures, systems and components of 
the power plant that fulfil their basic safety functions during and after the earthquake. The 
quantification of the margins is also recommended by the IAEA Safety Guides NS-G-1.6 and 
NS-G-2.13 (IAEA, 2003 and 2009). The goal of the analysis is to determine the seismic shaking 
level at which there is a high-confidence-of-low-probability-of-failure (HCLPF). This HCLPF is 
mathematically defined as 95% confidence of less than 5% probability of failure. 
In SMA calculation the seismic capacity CS is to compare to the Seismic Margin Earthquake 
(SME) demand DS. The capacity and the demand have to be calculated according to codes 
and standards while some specific assumptions should be accepted. These assumptions are 
as follows (EPRI, 1998): 
- Load combination has to consist of normal and SME loads. The ground response 
spectrum is median-shaped. 
- Conservative estimate of median damping have to be used.  
- Best estimate structural model has to be used and the uncertainty in frequencies has to 
be accounted.  
- Calculation of the soil-structure interaction has to be best estimate taking into account 
the parameter variation. 
- Code specific minimum strength or 95% non-exceedance probability values 
- Static capacity equations to be used have to be for code ultimate strength (ACI) for 
concrete, or maximum strength, (AISC) for steel structures, or Service level D (ASME) 
or functional limits in case of mechanical equipment. 
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- Inelastic energy absorption values to be used for non-brittle failure modes and linear 
analysis can be taken e.g. from (IAEA, 2003a) 
- In-structure spectra have to be calculated by frequency shifting rather than peak 
broadening to account for uncertainty while median damping is used. 
The capacity-demand ratio for elastic response (ܥ ܦ⁄ )ா is: 
 ቀ஼஽ቁா 	= 	 ஼ି∆஼ೄ஽ೄା஽ಿೄ (1) 
where DNS is the concurrent non-seismic demand for all non-seismic loads in the load 
combination, ∆CS is the reduction of the capacity due to concurrent seismic loading. The 
inelastic capacity-demand ratio (ܥ ܦ⁄ )ூ can be similarly calculated taking into account the 
ductility Fμ. If the inelastic capacity-demand ratio (ܥ ܦ⁄ )ூ exceeds unity the seismic margin 
earthquake level SME exceeds the reference level earthquake RLE for what the existence of 
sufficient margin has to be demonstrated. Otherwise, the built-in capacity that can be 
utilized for sustaining the seismic demand is equal to ܥௌ = (ܥ − ܦேௌ), the seismic demand is 
equal to (ܦௌ+ΔCS). The RLE (or more precisely the PGA of the RLE) has to be scaled by the 
ratio ((ܥ − ܦேௌ) (ܦேௌ + Δܥௌ)⁄ ) in elastic response case; or by ܨఓ((ܥ − ܦேௌ) (ܦேௌ + Δܥௌ)⁄ ) 
when for inelastic response considered. That value will be the code deterministic failure 
margin with high confidence for low probability of failure (HCLPF) expressed in terms of 
the peak ground acceleration, i.e. 
 ܪܥܮܲܨ = 	 ஼ି஽ಿೄ஽ೄା௱஼ೄ ܨఓܽோ௅ா . (2) 
The seismic capability active equipment (electrical, electromechanical and I&C) is qualified 
by tests or empirical method (see Section 3.2.1 above). Based on the qualification or fragility 
test data or generic data, a bound of the test response spectra have to be defined at about the 
99 per-cent exceedance probability level. The in-structure response spectra calculated for the 
reference level earthquake and the ratio of the bound of the test response spectra and in-
structure/floor response spectra has to be calculated. Scaling up the reference level (PGA) 
with this ratio provides the HCLPF capacity of the equipment. The HCLPF capacity that has 
to be evaluated for all items needed for ensuring the basic safety function.  
A systematic SMA procedure and methodology has been developed by EPRI in NP 6041 
Rev 1 consisting of following main elements (EPRI, 1998): 
1. Definition of the Review Level Earthquake (RLE) 
2. Identification of success paths needed to bring the reactor into stable  
a. Two independent functional paths to shutdown 
b. Define components in the paths 
3. Plant walk-down 
c. Screening out the rugged components 
d. Identify characteristics, vulnerability 
e. Assures verification of as-installed properties and conditions 
f. Identify interactions  
4. Seismic capacity evaluation for unscreened components 
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The SMA seismic input is the Review Level Earthquake (RLE) that should exceed the 
SSE. The RLE is that screening level at which structures, systems and components, 
necessary for the shutdown of power plant and for keeping it in the stable shutdown 
condition and considered to be in the ‘success path’, should be examined. (According to 
the definition of given in EPRI NP-6041 report, SME is equivalent to RLE specified by 
NUREG-1407. There are three categories of sites according to the PGA: PGA≤0.3g, 
0.3<PGA≤0.5g and PGA>0.5g with reference level PGA 0.3g, 0.5g and >0.5g respectively. 
For the analysis, the NUREG/CR-0098 median shape ground motion response spectral 
can be selected.) 
In margin analysis, the success path selection must include a primary success path and an 
alternate success path utilizing to the greatest extent possible, different equipment. One of 
the paths must also have the capability to mitigate a small pipe break.  
The rugged components have to be screened out during the plant walk-down. For those 
components that were not screened out during the walk-down phase, additional analyses 
shall be executed to determine the HCLPF. The weakest component in a shutdown path 
then defines the plant level HCLPF for that path.  
For the new design, the margin beyond safe shutdown earthquake has to be demonstrated 
(HCLPF for at least 1.67 times of the SSE in the US design practice and 1.4 times of the SSE 
in the European design practice).  
The seismic margin assessment procedure is experience and expert judgment driven. 
Therefore the selection of the team is a decisive precondition for success and adequacy of 
the result. The development of the safe shutdown equipment list and performance of the 
walk-downs require very experienced team consisting of systems engineer, 
structural/seismic engineers trained in design and empirical qualification as well.  
3.2.3. Probabilistic seismic safety analysis (seismic PSA) 
One of the most complex cases for assessing the nuclear power plant (NPP) safety is the 
evaluation of the response of the plant to an earthquake load and the risk related with this. 
The objective of the seismic PSA is to define the contribution of the earthquakes to the core 
damage frequency of the reactor and finally to the overall risk of plant operation. Risk is 
expressed as triplets ܴ = ሼۦ ௜ܵ|݌௜|ܮ௜ۧሽ, where Si is the identification/description of the ith 
scenario or accident sequence; pi is the probability of occurrence of that scenario and Li is the 
measure of the consequences/losses caused by that scenario.  
In case of earthquake, the probability of damage/failure of a structure or component Pfail 
depends on a rather complex load vector ࢄ = (ݔଵ, ݔଶ, …) that expresses all features of the 
earthquake excitation (peak ground acceleration, duration of strong motion and frequency 
distribution of the energy of excitation). The Pfail can be calculated as follows:  
 ௙ܲ௔௜௟ = ׬ ℎ(ݔଵ, ݔଶ, …)	ܲோ (ݔଵ, ݔଶ, …)݀ݔଵ݀ݔଶ…, (3) 
 
Seismic Safety Analysis and Upgrading of Operating Nuclear Power Plants 
 
91 
where the ℎ(ݔଵ, ݔଶ, …)	 represents the hazard, i.e. it is the probability density function of 
applied loads and ܲ(ݔଵ, ݔଶ, …)	 denotes the conditional probability of failure. The 
Equation (3) is theoretically precise. Nevertheless, in the practice the peak ground 
acceleration is used as a single load parameter. There were also some attempts made for 
using the cumulative absolute velocity for load parameter (Katona, 2010, 2011). 
The basics of the seismic PSA were outlined in (Kennedy & Ravindra, 1984). Frequencies of 
core damage caused by an earthquake are calculated by modelling of the plant behaviour by 
event trees constructed to simulate the plant system response. Fault trees are needed for the 
development of the probability of failure of particular components taking into account all 
failure modes. The hazard is expressed as complementary probability: 1-cumulative 
probability function, i.e. probability that the peak ground acceleration exceeds a given 
value. The fragility is defined as the conditional probability of core damage as a function of 
a – the PGA at free surface. The behaviour of the plant is modelled by the Boolean 
description of sequences leading to failure. Plant level fragility is obtained by combining 
component fragilities according to the Boolean-expression of the sequence leading to core 
damage. The plant level fragility is defined as the conditional probability of core damage as 
a function of free field PGA at the site. Plant level fragilities are convolved with the seismic 
hazard curves to obtain a set of doublets for the plant damage state. A great number of 
studies have been published on the seismic PSA, a review and referencing all of them is 
impossible in the frame of recent study. The method is now well developed and 
standardised by ASME in ASME/ANS RA-S–2008 (ASME, 2008) (see also the addendum 
ASME/ANS RA-Sa–2009). 
According to ASME/ANS RA-S-2008, for evaluation of core damage frequency the doublets ൛ൻ݌௜௝ห ௜݂௝ൿൟ have to be calculated, where fij is the frequency of the earthquake induced plant 
damage state,  
 ௜݂௝ = ׬ ௜݂(ܽᇱஶ଴ ) ௗுೕௗ௔ ݀ܽᇱ, (4) 
where pij is the discrete probability of this frequency ݌௜௝ = ݍ௜݌௝; qi is the probability 
associated with ith fragility curve fi(a) and pj is the probability associated with jth hazard 
curve Hj. The seismic fragility fi(a) is the conditional probability of failure for a given value 
of seismic input parameter, e.g. peak ground acceleration. The fragility curve fi(a) is the ith 
representation of the conditional probability of the core damage. In the practice both the 
hazard and fragility is accounted by point estimates with subsequent uncertainty 
evaluation. The fragility is modelled by lognormal distribution:  
 ݂(ܽ) = ׬ ଵ√ଶగఉ಴௫௔଴ ݁ି(೗೙ೣషഋ)మమഁ಴మ ݀ݔ, (5) 
where ߤ = ݈݊ ܥ௠, is the logarithm of median capacity Cm, and the βC is the composite 
logarithmic standard deviation expressing the epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. The 
lognormal distribution of the fragility is a consequence of the representation of the median 
capacity, Cm, as a product and large number of different factors, Fi representing the 
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uncertainties of all contributing to the capacity factors as well as the uncertainty in demand, 
i.e. ∏ ܨ௜௜ . According to the central limit theorem the sum of random variables tends to the 
normal random variable independent form the distribution of each of them. This rule is 
applicable to the logarithm of the product above. 
The HCLPF is related to the Cm as follows: 
 ܥ௠ = ܪܥܮܲܨ ∙ ݁(ଶ.ଷଶ଺ସఉ಴). (6) 
The ℎ(ܽ) = ൬݀ܪ௝ ݀ܽൗ ൰ is the probability density function of the applied seismic load 
expressed in terms of peak ground acceleration, taken from the jth hazard curve. The form of 
the hazard curve is as follows (McGuire et al., 2001): 
 ℎ(ܽ) = ݇଴(ܽ)ି௞ , (7) 
where k0 and k are constants that can be defined on the basis of probabilistic seismic hazard 
assessment (PSHA).  
The basic steps of seismic PSA are the followings: 
1. Determination of seismic hazard by PSHA 
2. Systems analysis  
a. Fault trees and event trees 
b. Define accident sequences, associated systems, components 
3. Fragility analysis of SSCs – Conditional failure probability 
4. Integration of hazard and fragility resulting in seismic core damage frequency. 
Since the level of core damage probability to be assessed is very low, the assessment of 
seismic hazard has to be performed up to very low level of annual probability, e.g. up-to  
10-7/a or less. The median hazard curve can be used which can be defined adapting the 
guidance in the IAEA Safety Guide SSG-9 (IAEA, 2010). 
The consideration of uncertainty in both fragility and seismic hazard is important for 
adequate safety assessment. The above formulation uncouples the uncertainties in the load 
and resistance parameters, embodied in the in the fragility and load probability density 
functions respectively. These uncertainties are usually of different origins and it is 
convenient to be able to treat them separately. 
The level 1+ seismic PSA gives estimation for the probability of seismic induced reactor 
core-melt. The level 1+ means the examination of containment that includes the 
evaluation of the safety of containment integrity and isolation as well as the 
development of bypass. 
The experiences of the seismic probabilistic safety (risk) studies performed in the U.S. are 
summarised in (NRC, 2010). In comparison with core damage frequency (CDF) due to 
internal initiators, the seismic core damage frequencies seem to be dominating. Similar 
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conclusion can be made regarding seismic PSA results obtained for the Paks NPP, where the 
contribution of the seismic events to the total CDF is approximately equal to 75 per-cent of 
the total CDF; see also (Riechner et al., 2008) on the Swiss experiences. Generally, the 
acceptable level of the annual probability of reactor core damage due to seismic events is of 
order of magnitude 10-5. It seems that the uncertainties dominate the seismic CDF caused by 
both uncertainty of the hazard definition, especially in the range below 10-5/a frequencies, 
and by the uncertainty of the fragilities.  
An interval representation can be proposed for accounting the uncertainty of the fragility 
(Durga et al., 2009; Katona, 2010). The fragility is a doublet ൛ൻ݌௜ห ௝݂ൿൟ composed from set of 
fragility functions fi(a) with probability weight qi, where the variable a is the horizontal 
component of the ground motion acceleration. It can be represented by a probability box 
(p-box), ൛ൻ݌௜ห ௝݂ൿൟ → ൣܨത(ܽ), ܨ(ܽ)൧, where F(a) is the conditional probability distribution of 
the failure. The ൣFത(a), F(a)൧ is the probability-box specified by a left side Fത(a), and a right 
side F(a) distribution functions, where the relations Fത(a) ≥ F(a) and F(a) ≤ F(a) ≤ Fത(a) are 
valid.  
The most trivial case for the use of p-box can be the screening according to ruggedness of 
the component. The rugged components might be described by p-box with lower and upper 
bounding value of the variable a, or any other damage indicator, i.e. cumulative absolute 
velocity. The probability bounds can be defined via expert elicitation.  
It can also be convenient to express the uncertainty of fragility in form of a p-box, 
defined by a lower bound u(p) and an upper bound d(p) on the function L-1(p) defined as 
inverse of the probability distribution F(a), i.e. ݀(݌) ≥ ܮିଵ(݌) ≥ ݑ(݌), where p is 
probability level.  
As it was mentioned above, in the practice the lognormal distribution is applied for 
fragility of structures. If the bounds on mean,  and standard deviation  of a lognormal 
distribution L are known, ߙ ∈ ሼ(ߤ, ߪ)|ߤ ∈ ሾߤଵ, ߤଶሿ, ߪ ∈ ሾߪଵ, ߪଶሿሽ the bounds on the 
distribution can be obtained by computing the envelope of all lognormal distributions L 
that have parameters within the specified intervals: ݀(݌) = max௔ ܮఈିଵ (݌) and ݑ(݌) =minఈ ܮఈିଵ (݌). 
3.2.4. Probabilistic margin analysis 
The NRC seismic margins method (NUREG CR 5334) is a truncation of PSA, i.e. the plant 
systems are modelled by Boolean method, while the systems needed for ensuring the basic 
safety functions are considered, the seismic fragility curves are developed, and the plant 
level HCLPF is computed (Campbell, 1998). The procedure does not involve the use of a 
seismic hazard for the computation of the HCLPF and the core damage frequency is not 
calculated. 
The NRC seismic margins method involves the following steps (Prassinos at al, 1986): 
- Selection of the review level earthquake  
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- Development of systems models  
- Initial component ruggedness screening  
- Plant walk-down  
- Development of component and structural - fragilities  
- System analysis  
- Determination of plant level HCLPF  
The systems models and fragility curves are used to determine the dominant accident 
sequences and the plant level HCLPF. The RLE selection and walk-down procedures are 
similar to those used in the EPRI margin method. The screening is conducted to eliminate 
many components from fragility computations.  
The HCLPF capacities for components in each system included into the plant model have to 
be defined and combined according to the Boolean representation of the system via 
minimum-maximum procedure: minimum HCLPF of the elements connected by or-gate 
and maximum HCLPF of the elements connected by the and-gate. For example, if the 
Boolean representation of a system composed from elements A, B, C and D is equal to 
A*(B+C)*D then the HCLPF of the system is equal to Maximum of (A; Minimum of (B, C); D). 
The plant HCLPF can also been calculated via convolution procedure. 
3.2.5. Use of design methods and standards 
A consequent use of design methods and standards for the re-evaluation and upgrading is 
not practicable for the operating plants. However, in case if the plant was not designed for 
earthquakes or the hazard was very underestimated, the design methods and standards 
have to be used for achieving the compliance with design basis requirements as much as 
practicable.  
The graded approach has to be applied for appropriate selection of evaluation methods. 
Deviation from design procedures can be accepted in case of qualification of outliers of 
Class 3 (seismic classification see e.g. IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-1.6 (IAEA, 2003b), safety 
classification principles are given e.g. in the IAEA NS-R-1 (IAEA, 2000b).  
The possibility of differentiation at design is exposed by guideline NS-G-1.6: 
Class 1: design ensuring the function and great safety margin are necessary 
Class 2: items are classified because of seismic interactions; they ‘can be designed with 
smaller safety margin’  
Class 3: these can be designed differentiated according to hazard 
Class 4: general industrial standard can be used 
The assumptions and methods applicable for each tasks of the seismic re-evaluation and 
upgrading of the operating plants with the aim of design basis reconstitution are given in 
the Table 1. Practical example is given in Section 5 below. 
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Task Practicable/advisable method 
Evaluation of the seismic hazard of the site 
that includes the associated with earthquake 
events, e.g. liquefaction;  
Development of the design basis earthquake 
characteristics; 
As for new design, preferable PSHA (see the 
IAEA NS-R-3, SSG-9 and NS-G-3.6) 
DBE as for new design – The Ground Motion 
Response Spectra have to be modified in 
accordance to ASCE/SEI 43-05 (ASCE, 2005) 
and Reg. Guide 1.208 (NRC, 2007) to be taken 
for design basis response spectra. 
Identification of the structures, systems and 
equipment, which are needed for ensuring 
that basic safety functions; 
According to the safety and seismic 
classification plus interacting SSCs. 
Stable shutdown conditions have to be 
ensured as minimum for 72 hours. Single 
failure criterion has to be applied.  
Evaluation of the seismic capacity of SSCs 
and identification of the upgrading; 
Graded approach: Class 1-3 evaluation by 
analysis according to design codes; Class 1 
and 2 outliers has to be fixed; For Class 3 
outliers justification via less conservative 
method (realistic damping, inelastic 
response) or upgrade;  
Design and implementation of the necessary 
corrective measures (fixes and 
qualifications); 
Design of modification according to codes 
and standards. 
Qualification by tests or empirical method. 
Installation of seismic instrumentation; 
Development of pre-earthquake 
preparedness and post-earthquake 
measures; 
According to the IAEA NS-G-1.6, NRC 
Regulatory Guide and 1.12, 1.166 and 1.167, 
(IAEA, 1995; NRC, 1997a, 1997b, 2000, EPRI, 
1988, 1989, ANS 2002)  
Evaluation of the CDF due to earthquake, 
quantification of the safety margins. 
Seismic PSA 
Table 1. Assumptions and methods applicable while complying with newly defined design basis 
requirements 
3.3. Studies for restart after strong earthquake 
There are specific procedures developed for the evaluation of the plant safety after a strong 
earthquake that are part of the plant emergency procedures (EOPs) for the case of 
earthquake, e.g. (NRC, 1997a, 1997b), (EPRI, 1989), (ANS, 2002) and (IAEA 2011).  
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The post-earthquake evaluation is in principle eclectic. The practicable methods are e.g. the 
evaluation by analysis, margin assessment, checking the post-earthquake condition of 
equipment along empirical criteria, in-service inspections and testing. Selection of the 
method can be performed on the basis of walk-down and visual inspection’s experiences, 
safety classification, etc. Lessons learnt from the case of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant after 
the 2007 earthquake are of great importance.  
The justification of the continuation of the operation after a strong earthquake (even if it is 
below the SSE-level) is a rather complex issue.  
The design is success oriented. Consequently, the comparison design versus experienced 
parameters provides basis for a deterministic statement, whether an SSC will fail or not.  
The seismic PSA is failure oriented, it indicate the week links that have to be carefully 
checked. The margin studies quantify the built-in capacities/reserves that may cover the 
demand even beyond the design base, see (Kassawara, 2008).  
Although it is the most time-consuming and expensive, the careful testing and the 
implementation of state-of-the-art analysis methods and removing the unnecessary 
conservatism of material parameters (mainly the damping) seems to be the most powerful 
tool for the evaluation of post-event situation.  
There is an obvious need for a better damage indicator as the PGA and response spectra 
of the experienced earthquake and the comparison of these to the design base PGA and 
response spectra. The cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) is a good indicator for no 
damage according to the EPRI study (EPRI, 1988). Some recent studies show that the CAV 
can be used for damage indicator for assessing the post-event conditions, especially for 
the fatigue failure mode, since the CAV can be correlated to the product of the number of 
load cycles and the stress amplitudes, thus the fatigue lifetime limit can be written as a 
function of the CAV (Katona, 2011). Comparing of the Niigata-Chuetsu-Oki earthquake in 
2007 and the Great Tohoku earthquake in 2011, the most significant difference is not in the 
PGA but in the overall energy of the ground motion that is properly characterised by the 
CAV value. 
3.4. Severe accident management oriented studies 
Recently, the severe accident management (SAM) studies with regard to extreme 
environmental conditions and hazards become great importance. For the planning of the 
accident management and mitigation measures and development of the severe accident 
management guidelines, the possible accident scenarios have to be known and the plant 
vulnerabilities and robust features have to be identified. For the design of technical 
means for the accident management/mitigation, the post-event conditions have to be 
forecasted.  
For the adequate preparation for severe accident situations, simultaneous occurrence of 
extremities has to be assumed. Occurrence of additional earthquake induced events has 
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to be expected, if the beyond design basis hits the plant. For example soil liquefaction 
can be the dominating issue and cause cliff-edge effect on soft soil sites if a strong 
beyond design base earthquake hits the site, while the liquefaction may not happen in 
design base case.  
It has to be also assumed that extreme conditions, including logistical obstacles due to on-
site and off-site damages will be in place while the accident management measures have to 
be implemented.  
The seismic PSA and margin type analyses provide the basis for the definition of the 
possible damage sequences and identification of effective measures. According to the PSA 
experience, the most serious is the sequence of the total loss of power and possibility of the 
heat removal to the ultimate heat sink or even loss the ultimate heat sink while the 
containment isolation is lost with or without of containment isolation with or without 
significant structural damage of the containment.  
Essential task of the studies related to severe accident management is the aseismic design of 
the connections of the provisional systems for cooling the reactor and spent fuel pool 
(pipelines for cooling and DC/AC power cabling and connections). The design basis of these 
provisions has to be defined well beyond the plant “usual” design basis. The seismic hazard 
curve should be available for this reason. 
The concept and the main tasks of the severe accident management studies are as 
follows: 
1. identification of possible minimum configurations needed for shutdown and heat 
removal of the reactor and spent fuel and protection of the containment 
2. identification of provisional and mobile tools for ensuring the heat removal and 
containment protection 
3. plant walk-down for  
a. screening out the robust elements 
b. identification of interactions affecting the SSCs within the minimum configuration 
and the inhibiting the connections of provisional power and cooling lines 
c. identification of the logistical obstacles impeding the implementation of SAM 
measures 
4. identification of the measures needed for SAM 
5. assessment/quantification of the margins 
3.5. Role of the walk-downs 
As it has been shown in the Sections above, the walk-down of the power plant is a key 
element of the seismic re-evaluation and re-qualification of the operating NPPs. The walk-
downs provide the opportunity to see what is difficult or impossible to recognise just 
looking, reviewing the documentation. The aim of the walk-down is as follows: 
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1. to check the as-is conditions, i.e.  
a. the as-is lay-out conditions, 
b. the adequacy of the anchorages, 
c. to check the compliance with the conditions in the re-qualification database, 
2. to identify those interactions, which can potentially affect the performance of the 
seismic safety related structures, systems and components during the occurrence of an 
earthquake and can render this equipment inoperable,  
3. to check the feasibility of upgrading measures. 
Examples for checking the interaction items during the walk-down are listed below:  
- unreinforced masonry walls adjacent to safety-related equipment may fall and impact 
safety-related equipment or cause loss of function of such equipment,  
- fire extinguishers may fall and impact or roll into safety-related equipment, or spurious 
actuation of the fire extinguish system may happen,  
- inadequately anchored or braced equipment as vessels, tanks, heat exchangers, cabinets 
etc. may overturn, slide and impact adjacent safety-related equipment,  
- equipment carts, chains, air bottles, welding equipment etc. may roll into, slide, 
overturn, or otherwise impact safety-related equipment,  
- storage cabinets, office cabinets, files, bookcases etc. located, for instance in control 
rooms, may fall and impact adjacent safety-related equipment,  
- break/damage of non-safety related piping, tanks, heating may cause spray, flood and 
loss of function of the safety related systems, 
- flexible piping, cable trays, conduits, and heating, ventilation and air-conditioning 
(HVAC) ducts may deflect and impact adjacent safety-related equipment,  
- anchor movement may cause breaks in nearby piping, cable trays, conduits, HVAC 
ducts etc. that may fall or deflect and impact adjacent safety-related equipment,  
- emergency lights and lower ceiling panels can fall down and damage safety-related 
equipment free crane hooks may bang safety-related equipment in their vicinity,  
The plant walk-down is also required for the assessment of the severe earthquake 
vulnerabilities and design of accident management and mitigation measures, including the 
identification of the on-site and off-site logistical obstacles.  
3.6. Design of upgrading 
Design of the upgrading have to be performed according to the design codes and standards 
and for the design basis earthquake as defined by current licensing basis.  
The seismic upgrading are design modifications requiring proper configuration 
management and regulatory approvals. 
3.7. Role of the peer-reviews 
All methods presented above for the re-evaluation and re-qualification of the operating 
plants require specific knowledge and experience and decisively based on the expert 
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judgement. Consequently, the re-evaluation, re-qualification and upgrading of operating 
plants have to be peer reviewed to provide an independent overview of its adequacy. The 
recommendations for the peer review are part of the descriptions of the procedures and also 
given in the (IAEA, 2003, 2009). 
4. Pre-earthquake preparedness and post-earthquake actions 
4.1. Operating basis earthquake (OBE) exceedance 
Operating basis earthquake level is understood as a limit for the continuation of the safe 
operation. If the plant is designed for two levels of earthquake, i.e. OBE and SSE, the limit of 
safe operation should be set equal to the OBE PGA measured at free-field, or to the response 
acceleration level at an appropriate location of the structure, e.g. at containment basement, 
calculated for the OBE. If the acceleration is crossing the set level the reactor protection 
system is actuated automatically. An automatic seismic trip system could be designed in 
accordance with the concept of the reactor protection system design with regard to the 
instrumentation, redundancy and the logic of the generation of actuating command. The 
system design should eliminate as much as possible the spurious trips. There are different 
concepts for selection of the trigger level. A "high level" trip could be set based on some per-
cent of the SSE (usually chosen as greater than 60% of the SSE level) and could be designed 
to minimize spurious trips due to after-shock and low acceleration earthquakes. A "low 
level" trip would be set to activate on the compressional waves (P waves) when this first 
arrival caused displacement or acceleration greater than the calculated maximum allowable 
P wave for an OBE. The decision on the OBE exceedance per acceleration level crossing 
could be considered as traditional. Considerations have been made regarding advisability of 
the automated reactor shutdown in case of small earthquakes (Cummings, 1976, IAEA, 
1995). There are plants and sites in low and moderate seismic activity regions where an 
automatic PGA or acceleration level triggered shutdown can be caused by practically 
harmless ground motions. There are plants that are practically not designed for two levels of 
earthquakes just upgraded to comply with the SSE related requirements. For these cases the 
U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide and 1.12, 1.166 and 1.167, and the IAEA as well as the NRC 
documents on the “Advisability of seismic scram“ provide guidance; see the also the (IAEA, 
1995). 
At the plant in the moderate seismicity regions the operational limit related to the OBE 
exceedance is formulated in terms of cumulative absolute velocity and spectral amplitude of 
the acceleration and velocity response spectra measured at the free field; see (NRC, 1997a, 
1997b and 2000; EPRI, 1988; 1989, ANS 2002). According to U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 
1.166 the OBE exceedance criteria are as follows:  
“The OBE response spectrum is exceeded if any one of the three components (two 
horizontal and one vertical) of the 5 percent of critical damping response spectra generated 
using the free-field ground motion is larger than:  
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1. The corresponding design response spectral acceleration (OBE spectrum if used in the 
design, otherwise 1/3 of the safe shutdown earthquake ground motion (SSE) spectrum) 
or 0.2g, whichever is greater, for frequencies between 2 to 10 Hz, or  
2. The corresponding design response spectral velocity (OBE spectrum if used in the 
design, otherwise 1/3 of the SSE spectrum) or a spectral velocity of 6 inches per second 
(15.24 centimeters per second), whichever is greater, for frequencies between 1 and 2 
Hz.” 
The CAV is defined for each component of the free-field ground motion as  
 ܥܣܸ = ׬ |ܽ(ݐ)|଴் ݀ݐ, (8) 
where a(t) is a component of the ground acceleration, T is the duration of the strong motion.  
There are certain rules for the numerical calculation of the CAV: (1) the absolute acceleration 
(g units) time-history is divided into 1-second intervals, (2) each 1-second interval that has at 
least 1 exceedance of 0.025g is integrated over time, (3) all the integrated values are summed 
together to arrive at the CAV.  
The CAV check is exceeded if any CAV calculation is greater than 0.16 g-seconds.  
If the response spectrum check and the CAV check were exceeded, the OBE was exceeded 
and plant shutdown is required. 
4.2. Seismic instrumentation 
The seismic instrumentation has two important roles: 
- to provide information for the decision on OBE exceedance 
- to register the plant response for the post-event evaluation of the plant condition.  
The instrumentation providing response records for the evaluation post-event condition of 
the plant should be installed at most important/significant location of the structures and 
main components.  
The instrumentation for the judgement on the OBE exceedance has to be designed and fitted 
to the concept of limitation of the operation in case of earthquake. The instrumentation and 
voting logic for automatic scram should have the same structure, redundancy etc. as the 
reactor protection system.  
For example the Soviet designed SIAZ (System of Industrial Antisesmic Protection) system 
initiating automatic reactor scram consists of nine tri-axial accelerometers in three 
independent systems with independent electric power supply and two sets of them. 
Contrary to this the tri-axial accelerometers for evaluation of OBE exceedance via CAV and 
response spectrum criteria should be installed at protected free-field locations.  
Regarding design and installation of seismic instrumentation see (NRC, 1997c) and (IAEA, 
2003b). 
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4.3. Development of emergency operational procedures 
Activities that have to be executed during earthquake should be defined and adequate 
emergency operational procedures for accident prevention should be developed for the case 
of earthquake. The documents (NRC, 1997a, 1997b and 2000; EPRI, 1988; 1989, ANS 2002) 
and the (IAEA, 2011) provide guidelines for the development of the procedure.  
The development of earthquake related severe accident management guidelines can be 
performed on the basis of severe accident oriented studies (Section 3.4) and IAEA 
documents (IAEA, 2009b).  
5. Implementation example – Seismic safety programme at Paks NPP 
5.1. Basic principles and outline of the programme 
The case of Paks NPP is significantly different from the cases of other nuclear power plants 
regarding the initial basis and objective of their seismic safety programmes. Ab’ovo, Paks 
NPP has not been designed and qualified for the earthquake loads. The reason was twofold: 
the site seismicity was underestimated and the design basis was set to the MSK-64 intesity 5 
that was equal to the intensity of the historically credible earthquake plus one intensity ball. 
In mid eighties the safety deficiency had been recognised and a programme for the 
definition of the site seismic hazard had been launched, which had been extended to a 
comprehensive site evaluation programme, including geological, geophysical, seismological 
and geotechnical investigations as for design basis regarding the scope and the 
methodology. The probabilistic seismic hazard assessment had been completed in 1995 and 
the design basis earthquake had been defined on the 10-4/a non-exceedance level. The 
Hungarian Regulatory Authority had approved the new design basis, and requested to 
launch a programme for ensuring the compliance with newly defined design basis.  
It was already recognised at the very beginning of the seismic safety programme that a 
consequent and full scope re-design in line with design codes and standards and subsequent 
upgrading might be impossible at Paks NPP. Therefore, acknowledging the international 
practice and IAEA recommendations, the Hungarian authorities allowed the use of 
methodologies for seismic re-evaluation and re-qualification of operating NPPs, less 
conservative than the design procedures. Admittedly, in early phase of the implementation 
of the seismic safety programme of Paks NPP, there was a bloodless hope that the issues at 
Paks NPP could be managed via application of SQUG/GIP, EPRI deterministic seismic 
margin method, Seismic Evaluation Procedures of the DoE (see Section 3.2 above).  
Contrary to the relative alleviations regarding selection of the re-qualification methodologies, 
the scope of the seismic safety evaluation and upgrades was set by the regulation as for re-
design, covering not only the seismic safety classified SSCs (including interacting items), but 
the whole scope of safety classified SSCs with three times full redundancy with application of 
the single failure criterion has been accounted instead of considering a success path and a 
backup only, etc. Also the process requirements were set as for new design, e.g. the heat 
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removal after the design base earthquake shall be ensured unlimited in time, contrary to the 72 
hours requirement applicable in usual margin-type assessment. 
The real objective has been clearly understood after performing the first Periodic Safety Reviews 
in 1999, since the compliance with the just issued Nuclear Safety Regulations (Governmental 
Decree No 108/1997) requested to be achieved and demonstrated. It was recognised that the 
methodologies mentioned above does not provide the required for Paks NPP result regarding 
design base reconstitution, on the other hand they can’t be directly applied for VVER plants, 
certain adaptation was needed for accounting the VVER design features.  
The qualification of the Paks NPP have been executed as for the newly defined design basis 
earthquake by applying procedures and criteria for the new design, combined with the 
methods and techniques developed for seismic re-evaluation of operating nuclear power 
plants. The seismic safety programme of the Paks NPP is presented below in Figure 1. 
The description of the project as given below clearly indicates the similarities and 
differences between the programmes as understood in (Gürpinar & Godoy, 1998; Campbell 
at al, 1998) and programme at Paks NPP (Katona, 2001). 
The selection and use of methodologies has been graded in accordance with safety relevance 
of the system, structure or component. 
The Hungarian regulation requires performance of probabilistic safety analyses for internal 
and external events/initiators. Therefore, after implementing the seismic safety upgrading 
measures, the achieved level of safety has been quantified via seismic PSA, which provides 
the value of the CDF and also indicated certain week links to be avoided or accounted. 
The implementation of the programme was broken into three phases:  
Preparatory phase before 1995: The objective was to prepare the programme in a way that it 
could be executed within reasonable technical and economical limits (example see in Section 
5.4). Learning and trial of the methods were going on simultaneously with the site 
evaluation. The conservatism had to be handled carefully during the seismic safety 
assessment. The easy to perform fixes had been designed for preliminary conservative 
seismic input and implemented. The easy-fix project covers 10184 items for 4 units. The 
volumes of the works are given in Table 2. Total amount of structural steel used for fixes is 
equal to 445 tons. Safety related batteries for all four units have been replaced and fixed in 
the frame of the easy-fix project. 
Between 1996-1999: Selection of the methodology, evaluation of as-is seismic capacity and 
identification of the fixes had been performed. 
Design and implementation of fixes 1999-2003: The amount of works is illustrated in Figure 
2 and 3 and in Table 3. 
The programme was broken down into manageable tasks and projects while the uniformity 
of the requirements and assumptions between these tasks had been ensured by appropriate 
quality assurance programme and methodological and criteria documents developed for 
each task. 
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Figure 1. Structure and tasks of seismic safety programme at Paks NPP 
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Task number of items fixes 
mechanical equipment 202 anchorages 
electrical equipment 465 anchorages 
cable trays 2498 anchorages 
I&C (cabinets, racks) 2061 anchorages and top bracing 
brick walls 281 steel frame fixes 
total number of easy-fix items 5507  
Table 2. Tasks and work volumes of the easy-fix project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Viscous-dampers below the steam-generator 
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Figure 3. Steel-frame bridge between localisation towers for fixing the frames of the reactor hall 
(columns) in cross-wise direction 
 
Qualification and upgrades Time frame Tasks/Volume 
Electrical and I&C equipment 1993-2002 Qualifications, replacements 
High energy pipelines of primary circuit 
and equipment 
1997-1999 
250 fixes (GERB viscous-
dampers) 
Structure of the turbine and reactor hall 1999-2000 1360 t of steel fixes 
Support bridge at localization towers 2000-2001 300 t of steel fixes 
Other classified pipelines of primary 
circuit and the components 
1998-2000 760 fixes 
Classified piping and components of 
secondary circuit, fixes of supporting 
steel structures in the turbine building 
2000-2002 
160 t of added steel structures 
1500 fixes 
Other classified pipelines and equipment 2001-2002 80 fixes 
Measures identified by seismic PSA 2002- 
Fixing the joints in the turbine 
building, relays qualification 
Table 3. Tasks and work volumes of the easy-fix project 
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5.2. The seismic design basis 
5.2.1. Seismic hazard 
Full-scope site geological, geophysical, seismological and geotechnical investigation and 
evaluation has been performed with subsequent probabilistic seismic hazard assessment 
(PSHA). The methodology is described in (Tóth et al., 2009). 
The design base earthquake is defined on the 10-4/a non-exceedance level, taken on the mean 
hazard curve. Recent Hungarian regulatory requirement is: the design base event has to be 
defined on the median hazard curve at 0.005 non-exceedance probability for the total 
lifetime of the plant, which means exactly a 10-4/a frequency for a 50 years operational 
lifetime (or approximately 10-5/a for a new built). 
The horizontal and vertical peak ground accelerations (PGA) are equal to 0.25g and 0.2g 
respectively. (The PGA correlated to the original design basis seismicity was 0.025g.)  
The uniform hazard response spectra were defined for the Pannonian surface (as for a 
virtual outcrop) below the site. The ground motion response spectra (GMRS) are calculated 
taking into account the nonlinear features of the soft soil layer covering the site.  
The results are shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Accounting site mean spectral ratios and mean bedrock and surface UHRS at 5% damping for 
three different probability levels 
The acceptability of the obtained ground motion response spectra for the design base was 
justified earlier (in 1995) by comparison with deterministically defined 84% response spectra 
(on the basis of US NRC Draft Guide 1032 issued later as Regulatory Guide 1.165) and 
recently per U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.208 (NRC, 2005) and ASCE/SEI 43-05 procedure 
(ASCE, 2005). The latter ensure the avoidance of the cliff-edge effect with respect to the 
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seismic input, since the increase in the amplitudes in ground motion response spectra due to 
relatively small increase (one order of magnitude) in the exceedance probability is 
accounted. 
The parameters of a 10-2/a non-exceedance level earthquake have also been defined. The 
PGA is equal to 0.087g in this case. This information is used for certain fatigue type analyses. 
The response spectrum and cumulative absolute velocity criteria are used for the definition 
of OBE exceedance; see US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.166 (NRC, 1997a). 
5.2.2. Geotechnical conditions 
There is Pleistocene layer of 25-30 m covering the site, the upper 12-15 part of which 
originates from floods and consists of fine structure, well classified sand, while its lower 
part consist of sandy gravel and gravel. Under the Pleistocene layers, there are various 
upper Pannonian layers, which are irregularly divided by sandstone ridges. These ridges 
are cemented to various extents and can be regarded as semi-rock. The 25-30 m saturated 
young soft soil (~300m/s shear-wave velocity) covering the eroded Pannonian surface at the 
site is susceptible to liquefaction at the depth 10-15 m. The probabilistic liquefaction analysis 
performed in 1995 has shown that the best estimate return period of the occurrence of 
liquefaction exceeds 10000 years therefore the liquefaction was not considered as a design 
basis phenomenon.  
For the seismic PSA purposes, the evaluation of the site effects was extended to very low 
probabilities (10−4÷10−6/a). According to the seismic PSA the building relative settlement due 
to the liquefaction is the dominating effect contributing to the CDF just below the design 
basis probability level. This experience triggered a state-of-the-art analysis of the 
liquefaction. It was also observed that the uncertainty of the analysis is essential due to 
uncertainty of soil parameters and the methods.  
Liquefaction susceptibility can be expressed in terms of factor of safety FSliq against the 
occurrence of liquefaction as,  
 ܨ ௟ܵ௜௤ = ஼ோோ஼ௌோ  (9) 
where CRR is the cyclic resistance ration and the CSR is cyclic stress ratio, see Regulatory 
Guide 1.198 (NRC, 2003). The cyclic stress generated by the given earthquake is as follows 
(Seed and Idriss 1971): 
 ܥܴܵ = ఛೌೡఙೡబᇲ = 0.65 ∙ ቀఙೡబఙೡబᇲ ቁ ∙ ቀ௔೘ೌೣ௚ ቁ ∙ ݎௗ (10) 
where av is the equivalent shear stress amplitude, amax is the peak horizontal acceleration at 
ground surface, g is the acceleration of gravity, v0 and ’v0 are the total and effective vertical 
overburden stresses, respectively, and rd is a nonlinear stress reduction coefficient that varies 
with depth. 
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Depending on the method used the value of safety factor varies in rather wide range. The 
methodologies (Seed & Idriss, 1971, 1982; Tokimatsu & Yoshimi, 1983) used for Paks site 
resulted in a relative low margin, while the analysis via effective stress method provides 
much larger margins (Győri et al, 2002).  
The building settlement caused by earthquake can affect the underground communications 
(service water piping and emergency power supply cables) due to relative displacements. 
This effect will be amplified if liquefaction occurs. The dominant failure mode in the 
acceleration ranges higher than the design basis is due to the relative building caused by the 
soil liquefaction. This makes it necessary to re-qualify the underground lines and 
connections jeopardized by the settlement of the main building or, if it is necessary, to 
modify them to make their relative movement unimpeded. An advanced probabilistic 
liquefaction and relative building settlement analysis is going on using an amended soil 
parameter database in relation to the investigation of beyond design base vulnerabilities 
performed for severe accident management reasons (Győri et al, 2011). 
5.3. Identification of SSCs for safe shutdown – Seismic classification 
The procedure for the safe shutdown, cool-down and long-term heat removal of the reactors 
has been elaborated in two versions (Katona, 2003).  
The first version was developed before 1995, when a very conservative guess of the DBE 
(with PGA 0.35g) was available. For this high demand, a safe shutdown technology was 
selected that could be realised by the upgrading of the minimum number of systems. It was 
advisable to select systems for the safe shutdown and cool-down, which are situated in the 
reinforced concrete containment part of the main building because only this part of the 
building seemed to sustain the loads. The upgraded and not upgraded systems or parts of 
systems should be separated in case of earthquake by fast closing valves. The control rods, 
and boron system would ensure shutdown of the reactor, and the stable subcritical 
conditions. The reactor should have been cooled-down by the secondary bleed and feed. 
The long-term heat removal would have been executed through the heat exchangers of the 
low-pressure emergency core cooling system that should have been modified for the 
execution of this function. This concept would require modifications in the safety systems 
and the installation of the great number of valves. Analysing the feasibility issues, it has to 
be recognised that the implementation of the concept is not only very expensive but it can 
reduce safety in all other cases than an earthquake because of the modification of the low 
pressure emergency core cooling system. 
Performing the analyses for main building complex, it was recognised that the most 
critical structure is the gallery building that gives place to several vital systems and I&C 
equipment. This part of the main building should have been upgraded. Developing the 
possible technical solution for upgrading the longitudinal gallery building, it turned out 
that it can be best performed, if the steel frames of the turbine hall and the reactor hall are 
also fixed. This solution allows the application of structural upgrades that do not require 
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fixes in the over-crowded by equipment and piping gallery building. If it the case, the 
systems for regular heat removal placed in the turbine hall would be available for heat 
removal after an earthquake, if their re-qualification is performed. Meantime, in 1995 the 
site seismic hazard evaluation has been completed which resulted in the DBE with 0.25g 
PGA. Response and stress calculations made for the newly defined DBE have shown that 
essential part of the mechanical equipment and pipelines can sustain the DBE demand 
and the reinforcement of the systems and structures necessary for seismic safety is feasible 
with reasonable effort.  
Theoretical considerations have been made for the evaluation of upgrading effort 
required for fixing the pipelines and components required for heat removal via systems 
“as usual”, i.e. systems dedicated for emergency cases. It has been assumed that the “as 
is” seismic capacity of the pipe segments can be treated as a random variable; its value 
can be expressed by total design capacity multiplied by several factors representing the 
randomness of the actual design features, floor-response, etc. If it is the case, the 
calculated “as is” HCLPF values of pipe segments have to be lognormal distributed. If the 
distribution is known, the parameters of the distribution can be defined on the basis of 
HCLPF calculations for “as is” conditions and the number of pipe segments requiring 
fixes can be evaluated. The distributions of “as is” HCLPF values of pipe segments 
presented in Figure 5 justified the assumptions and made possible the evaluation of 
upgrading needs. 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of “as is” HCLPF values of pipe segments (units 1-4 and units 3-4)  
Based on the assessment of fixes of the piping and components, the cost of these fixes turned 
to be cheaper than the (automatic) isolation of the unreinforced parts of the systems by a 
great number (more than 100/unit) of fast closing valves.  
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Consequently, instead of a success path and backup for heat removal, the concept has been 
chosen that is based on the use of systems devoted for heat removal as per design, taking 
into account the design philosophy of the VVER-440/213 and widely using the synergy 
between structural and component fixes.  
Meantime, the new nuclear regulation issued in 1997 required the upgrading and 
qualification of the SSCs enrolled into seismic classes. Moreover, the regulation requested to 
ensure the adequate capacity of the safety classified SSCs for hazards. Consequently, the 
scope of the seismic safety evaluation and upgrades was set as for re-design, covering not 
only the seismic safety classified SSCs (including interacting items), but the whole scope of 
safety classified SSCs with three times full redundancy, with application of the single failure 
criterion. The stable and unlimited in time cold shutdown condition have to be ensured after 
the design base earthquake. 
According to the selected concept the sub-criticality is maintained by the shutdown and 
boron control systems. The cool-down is ensured by secondary-side bleed and feed. The 
continuous cooling is maintained by the heat removal system. In all redundant trains, the 
SSCs needed for ensuring these safety functions are fixed and qualified for DBE.  
Certain modifications have been implemented for making possible the required functioning, 
e.g. modification of the venting of the tubes of control assemblies on the reactor pressure 
vessel head. The systems not required for the safety functions are isolated automatically 
from the seismically qualified one. The procedure was developed assuming that the plant is 
in normal operational condition; the outside energy supply (grid) and make-up water 
source is not available for 72 hours.  
Loss of coolant accident is not assumed in consequence of the earthquake; hence, the 
primary system piping is fixed for DBE according to the design rules. Nevertheless, all 
redundant safety trains including emergency core cooling systems have been upgraded 
and qualified for DBE. Consequently the sequences with loss-of-coolant can also be 
managed, although these are already beyond design base sequences according to the 
safety philosophy.  
On the other hand, the consequences of the small breaks (impulse pipes, drains, air vents) 
shall be examined from the aspect of the dose limits and containment integrity. The break of 
small-bore pipes shall be considered in connection with the passive single failures (see 
article 5.3 of NS-G-2.13). The degree of passive single failures is limited to the break of 
small-bore pipes (<DN50) and to the leakage of the sealing of pumps or valves. 
Those non-safety-classified SSCs have to be also fixed for DBE, failure of which may 
endanger the integrity or functioning of the safety systems. The possibility of fires and 
flooding induced by earthquake is also avoided via modification and fixing of the relevant 
systems, and installing letdown systems for lubricant and Hydrogen.  
The systems for the heat removal of the spent fuel and refuelling pools are also fixed and 
qualified for DBE.  
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The SSCs have been formally classified: Seismic Class 1 – active systems and components, 
Seismic Class 2 – passive structures and components (thereafter SCs) needed for ensuring 
the basic safety functions during and after DBE; Seismic Class 3 – SSCs are those, failure 
of which may inhibit the safety functions (interacting SCs, falling-on, casing fire or 
flooding, etc.). Seismic Class 4 – no safety functions and no interaction. Obviously, the 
scope of seismic safety programme at Paks NPP envelops the scope defined in the 
international practice for the operating nuclear power plants. Chapter 5 of NS-G-2.13 
(IAEA, 2009) only prescribes the re-qualification of the minimal number of SSCs necessary 
for the implementation of safety functions during and after the earthquake. In case of 
Paks NPP this concept could not been applied since the design basis had to be 
reconstructed. Thus the requirements of the IAEA NS-R-1 and NS-G-1.6 were applied. The 
rational for seismic classification is rather questionable. If the safety related safety 
classified SSCs have to be designed for the design base external hazards, the basic safety 
functions would be ensured by these SSCs in case of earthquake too, i.e. no need of the 
seismic and safety classification. 
5.4. Response and strength analysis of structures and components 
Two approaches can be accepted for analysis of the soil-structure interaction: 
- flexible volume model, flexible volume frequency domain method 
- rigid boundary model, rigid boundary time domain method. 
In case of the rigid boundary method, the modal damping was limited according to 
international standards (e.g. KTA 2201.3: 15% for horizontal, 30% for vertical motion). 
Although the uncertainty of the geotechnical data had been extensively studied, three 
values of the soil share modulus Gmin, Gav and Gmax, have to be considered for handling the 
uncertainty of soil parameters, where Gmin = 0.5 Gav and Gmax = 2.0 Gav (according to ASCE-4 
(ASCE, 1998), 1.5 Gav is acceptable as minimum value). 
The analysis of the structural response and capacity of the structures graded approach have 
been applied, i.e. the modelling and the analysis method have been selected according to the 
safety relevance of the structure.  
The most important building complex is the VVER-440/V213 main reactor building that 
consists of the reinforced concrete confinement with the localization tower and the attached 
longitudinal and transversal gallery buildings, as well as the reactor and turbine hall. The 
most critical parts of the complex structure are the longitudinal and transversal gallery 
buildings. A method with solution of the equations of motion in frequency domain has been 
applied for analysis (Katona et al, 1995a). 
The secondary buildings are box-shaped structures composed of reinforced concrete 
prefabricated elements or structures composed of foundation and an upper steel structure. 
Because of the structural complexity of these buildings, an up-to-date 3D modelling was 
 
Nuclear Power – Practical Aspects 
 
112 
required. The soil-structure interaction was be modelled by frequency independent soil 
springs and dampers.  
Unique blast tests have been performed for empirical modal analysis of the dynamic 
behaviour of the main building structures and for the verification of the models developed 
(Katona et al, 1992, 1993a; Halbritter at al, 1993a). These tests provide good information 
regarding soil-structure interaction under small-strain excitation. 
For optimal modelling of primary system responses, a coupled mechanical and structural 
model has been developed (Halbritter et al, 1993b; Katona et al, 1993b, 1994, 1999). 
The selection of upgrading concept for buildings has been made iteratively. For all options 
of upgrading, the response and resistance of modified structure has been made and the 
optimal solution selected via comparison of response and strength achieved. After selection 
of final upgrading solution the dynamic calculations have been repeated for the modified 
configuration for justification of the adequacy of the upgrades and development of the floor 
response spectra. Latter has little importance for the reinforced concrete containment part of 
the main building complex, but it was essential, e.g. in the gallery buildings. The same 
iterative procedure has been applied in case of Reactor Coolant System upgrade, and the 
fixed configuration has been re-calculated for the justification of code compliance of the 
integrity (Katona et al, 1999). 
The methods for evaluation of as-built capacity of structures and components (passive SCs) 
have been selected in accordance of safety and seismic class, as follows: 
- Safety Class 1 and 2 mechanical components, piping, etc. and Safety Class 2 buildings – 
straightforward design procedure (codes and standards) have been used. For example, 
for the pressure retaining boundaries Class 1 and 2 German design code KTA, and for 
the Class 3 ASME; KTA-ASME comparative study also made, purely elastic approach) 
has been applied; 
- The Class 3 SCs failed to comply with design codes have been generally evaluated 
using realistic assumptions for damping and ductility similar to the (IAEA, 2003).  
- small bore, low-energy pipes – simplified code based method. 
The floor response spectra used for the component capacity evaluation was defined 
according to the design codes (see e.g. ASCE-4-86). However, in case of Class 3 SCs that 
failed when conservative floor response was used, the calculation was performed for the 
best estimate floor response spectra (FRS). The best estimate FRS has been obtained either 
via probabilistic method, or taking into account the inelastic energy absorption, or 
accounting the equipment-structure mass ratio.  
In those cases when the existing supports of pipelines are modified in order to provide 
adequate seismic capacity, e.g. when the number or type of the supports is changed, it shall 
be demonstrated on the basis of the relevant nuclear standards (ASME BPVC Section III 
(ANSI ANS N690) or KTA 3201, 3211, 3205) that the upgraded high energy pipelines and 
their supports comply with the following criteria: 
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- The effect of restrained thermal expansion due to the modified pipeline’s supports 
complies with the requirements of the standard;  
- The requirements of the standard are met without using the ductility. 
- The pipeline’s supports comply with the requirements of ASME BPVC Section III NF or 
ANSI ANS N690 or equivalent nuclear standards (e.g. the German KTA) when they are 
affected by pipeline reaction due to normal operational conditions (including the 
restrained thermal expansion) + seismic inertia forces + seismic anchor motion loads 
related to DBE. 
5.5. Qualification of active components 
The qualification of active components has been made by several methods: 
- Some systems should be replaced or reconstructed for safety upgrading reasons, e.g. the 
reactor protection system (Siemens Teleperm XS). The new systems and equipment 
should be qualified and certified by the supplier for the conservatively defined floor 
response spectra. 
- Shaking table testing of sample items. 
- Qualification via empirical procedures (GIP, GIP-VVER). 
For example, the relays have been qualified by replacing the not to be qualified by new one, 
shaking table testing of samples for in-rack response spectra (Katona et al, 1995b), 
experience based method, where it was applicable.  
Since the GIP database does not specifically include all the equipment of Paks NPP 
(manufactured in the Soviet Union or Eastern European countries), it was necessary to apply 
GIP-VVER (Masopust, 2003) incorporating the knowledge and experience gained during the 
evaluation of VVER type power plants.  
The comparison of 1.5 times bounding spectra (BS) to the floor response spectra is always 
recommended instead of the comparison of bounding spectra to the ground motion 
response spectra even below the 12 m level of the building. 
5.6. Summary of assumptions, codes and standards and methods 
The assumptions accepted for the re-evaluation are summarised in the Table 4. The 
applicable codes and methods are summarised in the Table 5.  
The mixed use of the codes was excluded by careful definition of the evaluation packages. 
The assumptions, allowable stresses, etc. of the KTA and ASME have been compared.  
The operability of active technological components should be qualified by empirical re-
qualification procedures or test. The equipment classes and applied empirical 
qualification methods for active and certain passive components are summarised in the 
Table 6. 
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Load combinations NOL+DBE 
Damping, ductility Code values or realistic for repeated checking of outliers 
Structural models Graded approach to the modelling: best estimate if applicable 
Floor response spectra Conservative design floor response spectra. 
In specific case best estimate 
Material strength Minimum values determined by standard 
Capacity evaluation Design type evaluation KTA, primary system and vital 
mechanical equipment and 
pipelines inside the confinement 
area 
Margin type evaluation CDFM+ASME 
Simplified evaluation Code based simplified procedures 
Operability GIP or GIP-VVER, if applicable, otherwise test 
Table 4. Summary of applicable standards and methods 
 
Equipment Item Applicable standards 
Passive equipment 
(tanks, pressure 
vessels, etc.) 
Component body 
including internal parts 
ASME BPVC Section III, Service level D 
KTA 3201/3211 
Supports ASME BPVC Section III Subsection NF 
KTA 3205; Subsection according to 
Classes. 
Essential nozzles ASME BPVC Section III, Service level D 
KTA 3201/3211 
Interactions GIP, GIP-VVER  
Active equipment Operability GIP-VVER 
Component body 
including internal parts 
ASME BPVC Section III, Service level D 
KTA 3201/3211 
Supports ASME BPVC Section III Subsection NF 
KTA 3205;  
Essential nozzles ASME BPVC Section III, Service level D 
KTA 3201/3211 
Interactions GIP, GIP-VVER  
Pipelines Pipelines ASME BPVC Section III, Service level D 
KTA 3201/3211 
Supports ASME BPVC Section III Subsection NF 
KTA 3205;  
Interactions GIP, GIP-VVER  
Table 5. Summary of applicable standards and methods 
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Equipment classes Recommended qualification procedure 
A. The original twenty classes:
1. Motor Control Centres GIP if applicable
GIP-VVER, tests if the item does not fit to 
the database 
2. Low Voltage Switch-gears
3. Medium Voltage Switch-gears
4. Transformers GIP-VVER experience data or tests 
5. Horizontal Pumps
6. Vertical Pumps
7. Fluid-Operated Valves
8. Motor-Operated Valves
9. Fans 
10. Air Conditioning Devices
11. Cooling Devices
12. Air Compressors
13. Motor Generators
14. Distribution Panels
15. Batteries on Racks
Equipment classes Recommended qualification procedure 
16. Battery Chargers and Inverters
17. Engine Generators
18. Instrument Racks
19. Sensor Racks
20. Control Panels and Cabinets
B. Additional classes:
21. Relays, Switches, Transmitters, 
Solenoids, Sensors 
Test if the item does not fit to the database 
22. Electrical Penetration Assemblies
C. Additional VVER classes:
23. Vertical and Horizontal Tanks Limited analysis, GIP-VVER
24. Vertical and Horizontal Heat Exchangers
25. Ventilation Ducts
26. Cable Trays and Conduits
27. Small and Large Bore Cold Pipes
Table 6. Summary of qualification methods 
5.7. Seismic PSA 
The final evaluation of the effectiveness of upgrading measures and justification of the 
acceptable level of achieved safety in terms of CDF have been made via seismic PSA (Katona 
& Bareith, 1999; Bareith, 2007; Elter, 2006). The seismic PSA demonstrated that the CDF 
ensured by the implementation of rather extensive upgrading programme is of order of 
magnitude 10-4/a. The PSA identified also several week links. For example, the capacity of 
the joints of the turbine hall structure was found insufficient. Eventual collapse of the 
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turbine building may cause steam and feed-water header ruptures that result in total loss of 
main and auxiliary feed-water and disables closed loop heat removal through the secondary 
side. Repeated analysis for the case after implementing the additional measures resulted 
into CDF value of magnitude of 10-5/a, which is acceptable per Hungarian regulations.  
The seismic PSA indicated also that the building settlement of the buildings due to the soil 
liquefaction jeopardizes the communications (pipes for diesel generator cooling and cables 
coming from the diesel generators) between the buildings. In the lower acceleration ranges 
the soil liquefaction that cause settlement of the main building plays dominant role in the 
occurrence probability of total loss of electric power supply. The studies indicated in Section 
5.2.2 are focused on the liquefaction hazard. 
The methodology of the seismic PSA applied at Paks NPP complies with the best 
international practice, see IPEEE NUREG-1407 (NRC, 1991) and (IAEA, 1993). The SPSA was 
developed on the basis of extensive PSA experience and existing PSA models for Paks NPP 
and information from newly performed response and strength analyses and qualification 
effort of the plant and plenty of walk-downs. 
5.8. Seismic instrumentation and seismic EOPs 
In case of an earthquake, the reactor is shutdown either by reactor protection system due to 
malfunctions, or manually by the operator based on the criteria of CAV and response 
spectrum criteria for OBE exceedance. The OBE-exceedance criteria is set CAV=0,16gs and 
response spectrum in the amplified range less than 0,2g. The seismic instrumentation and 
the pre-earthquake preparedness and post-earthquake actions are defined via adaptation of 
the IAEA NS-G-1.6, US NRC Regulatory Guide and 1.12, 1.166 and 1.167 respectively. 
Selection of the OBE exceedance criteria at Paks NPP was based on the analysis of the 
frequency of expected events, probability and consequences of spurious signals. 
It has to be noted that the implementation of the concept and methodology for OBE-
exceedance was not a simple copy-paste; it has been adapted to the conditions of Paks NPP. 
At Paks NPP, if the ggset measured at the base mat, the non-upgraded part of certain 
systems will be automatically isolated from the upgraded one by quick-closing valves. 
These system’s parts do not have function during and after an earthquake and the 
separation will not disturb the operation either. In the same time, there is also a signal for 
control room. If an earthquake happens, there are two possible cases:  
- The plant will be shutdown automatically due to disturbances, initiating event(s) 
caused by the earthquake and the sequence of actuations will depend on the initiating 
event. Further operator actions depend on the plant condition. The operator actions are 
defined by EOPs and trained on the simulator. 
- If the plant remains in operation after earthquake, the decision on OBE exceedance will 
be made by operator based on CAV and response spectrum criteria. The plant will 
continue to operate or will be shutdown if OBE exceeded. If the reactor scram initiated 
but the OBE hasn’t been exceeded, the restart has to be performed after predefined 
testing and walk-downs.  
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The seismic recording systems composed from tri-axial accelerometers that are installed at 
critical locations of structures and main components, provide information for the post-event 
evaluation of the plant condition. 
5.9. Summary of the methods applied at Paks NPP 
The comparison of the seismic re-evaluation methods “as usual” and the methods applied at 
Paks NPP is shown in the Table 7.  
 
 Seismic Margin Seismic PSA DB reconstitution at Paks 
NPP 
S PSA at Paks NPP 
Input RLE Hazard curve PSHA: median 10-4/a non-
exceedance, site specific 
GMRS (UHRS), nonlinear 
soil, DRS as per Reg. Guide 
1.208 
Hazard curve; 
UHRS; 
Nonlinear soil for GM; 
Analysis of liquefaction; 
Scope Success + 
backup path 
Event tree/ fault 
tree  
All Safety related (+ 
interacting) 
Event tree/ fault tree 
modelling 
Structural 
response 
Median 
structural 
response, 
frequency 
shifting 
Probabilistic 
structural 
response 
Conservative structural 
response, (Gmin, Gmax, Gav), 
conservative FRS, median 
FRS in limited cases, Class 3 
outside of containment  
Detailed information 
available, from the 
previous works 
Screening Walk-down and 
screening per 
margins criteria, 
experience-
based 
Walk-down and 
screening per 
fragility 
estimations 
Walk-down and screening 
per margins considerations 
and GIP, GIP-VVER, only 
the bounding spectrum 
criterion was accepted. 
Based on the extensive 
previous works 
Evaluation, 
qualification 
Analysis of 
selected SCs 
(CDFM) 
Selected fragility 
calculations. 
Median 
capacities+ log 
standard 
deviations 
As per new design for Class 
1 and 2 SCs, realistic 
damping and ductility for 
Class 3; Testing, GIP, GIP-
VVER and replacement for 
active 
Detailed information 
available + fragility 
development based on 
the results of the 
performed analyses; 
Containment + 
Liquefaction 
Relay 
qualification 
Screening; 
qualification of 
outliers 
Screening + 
limited fragility 
Qualification per screening 
Test or replacement 
Screen and limited 
fragility development 
Modifications Upgrades if 
needed 
Risk informed 
upgrades 
Replacements, upgrading per 
design requirements 
Certain additional needs 
for upgrades identified 
Results Plant level 
HCLPF 
CDF Design basis reconstituted Weak links, CDF and its 
uncertainty evaluated 
Abbreviations used in the Table 7: GMRS, UHRS, DRS – ground motion, uniform hazard and design base response 
spectra respectively, FRS – floor response spectra; Gmin, Gmax, Gav – maximum, minimum, and average values of the soil 
shear modulus; CDFM – Code Deterministic Failure Margin (see Section 3.2.2). 
Table 7. The seismic re-evaluation methods as usual and the methods applied at Paks NPP 
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6. Maintaining the seismic qualification during operation 
6.1. Modification design and procurement of equipment 
During modifications, replacements and reconstructions, design and procurement can be 
executed by complying with the seismic safety requirements corresponding to the seismic 
and safety classification. These processes are part of the configuration management and 
subject to authority approval. There is a database for seismic and safety SSCs. A procedure 
exists ensuring the adequacy of the design and procurement specifications.  
6.2. Operation and maintenance aspects 
Adequate maintenance and status monitoring programs are in place in order to maintain the 
required status of elements classified from the point of view of seismic safety and requiring 
maintenance, e.g. the anchorage of piping and components, damping devices. Maintenance 
of the qualification for earthquake is also part of the ageing management programmes. 
6.3. Seismic housekeeping 
The proper housekeeping is not irrelevant from the point of view of seismic safety. The 
following actions have to be required: 
- Restoring of fixing elements of cabinets and racks after maintenance 
- Restoring of the anchorages, fixing bolts, pipe hangers and the damping devices 
requiring maintenance and review, 
- Appropriate fixing of maintenance devices stored in the plant area. 
7. Periodic safety reviews 
According to the IAEA Safety Standard NS-G-2.10, the aim of the Periodic Safety Review (PSR) 
is “to determine by means of a comprehensive assessment of an existing nuclear power plant: 
the extent to which the plant conforms to current international safety standards and practices; 
the extent to which the licensing basis remains valid; the adequacy of the arrangements that 
are in place to maintain plant safety until the next PSR or the end of plant lifetime; and the 
safety improvements to be implemented to resolve the safety issues that have been identified.” 
Regarding external hazards the objective of the review of hazard analysis is to determine the 
adequacy of protection of the nuclear power plant against internal and external hazards with 
account taken of the actual plant design, actual site characteristics, the actual condition of SSCs 
and their predicted state at the end of the period covered by the PSR, and current analytical 
methods, safety standards and knowledge.  
The period of the PSR is generally ten years. During ten years the knowledge and 
understanding of the site hazard may develop and a feedback from experiences of other 
plants may motivate review and upgrading programme. As it can be seen from the 
experiences of plenty of nuclear power plants, the seismic safety, just like the safety in 
general, is not a static thing and it covers the whole life cycle of the facility. 
 
Seismic Safety Analysis and Upgrading of Operating Nuclear Power Plants 
 
119 
Author details 
Tamás János Katona 
Nuclear Power Plant Paks Ltd., Hungary 
8. References 
ASME (2008) Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, ASME/ANS RA-S–2008,  
ANS (2002) Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake, Rep. ANSI/ANS-2.23-2002, ANS, La 
Grange Park, IL (2002) 
ASCE (1998) ASCE 4 Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and 
Commentary (ASCE 4-98) (Standard No. 004-98), American Society of Civil Engineers, 
1998 
ASCE (2005) Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear 
Facilities”, ASCE/SEI 43-05, 2005 
Bareith, A. (2007) Use of Insights from Seismic PSA for NPP Paks, Proceedings of the Specialist 
Meeting on the Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Nuclear Facilities, 336 p, 14 Nov 
2007, p. 66-75, NEA-CSNI-R--2007-14,  
Budnitz, R.J. et al. (1985) An Approach to the Quantification of Seismic Margins in Nuclear 
Power Plants, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-4334 
Campbell, R. D., et al. (1998) Seismic re-evaluation of nuclear facilities worldwide: overview 
and status, Nuclear Engineering and Design 182 (1998) 17–34 
Cummings G.E. et al, (1976) Advisability of Seismic Scram, UCRL-52156, June 30, 1976 
DoE (1997), Seismic Evaluation Procedure for Equipment in U.S. Department of Energy 
Facilities, DOE/EH-0545, March, 1997, Available from: 
http://www.hss.energy.gov/seismic/  
Durga, R. K. et al. (2009) Uncertainty Analysis Based on Probability Bounds (P-Box) 
Approach in Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Risk Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 5, pp. 662-675, 
2009, DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01221 
Elter, J. (2006) Insights from the seismic probabilistic safety analysis of Paks Nuclear Power 
Plant, International Conference on Reliability, Safety and Hazard, Mumbai 2005 
(ICRESH05), in Reliability, Safety and Hazard: Advances in Risk-informed Technology, 
Editor: P.V. Varde, 2006, pp. 381–387. 
ENSREG (2012), European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group, EU Stress Tests, Available 
from: http://www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests  
EPRI (1988) A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Electric 
Power Research Institute, NP-6041,  
EPRI (1989) Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake, Rep. EPRI-NP-6695, 
EPRI, Palo Alto, CA (1989) 
 
Nuclear Power – Practical Aspects 
 
120 
European Commission (2011) Technical Summary of the national progress reports on the 
implementation of comprehensive risk and safety assessments of the EU nuclear power 
plants, Brussels, 24.11.2011 SEC(2011) 1395 
Ewers, J., et al. (1993) Time-versus-Frequency Domain Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant 
Building Structures, 11th International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor 
Technology, August 14-20 1993, Stuttgart, Germany 
Gürpinar, A. and Godoy, A. (1998) Seismic safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe. 
Nuclear Engineering and Design, Volume 182, Issue 1, 2 May 1998, Pages 47–58 
Györi, E. et al. (2002) Site Effect Estimations with Nonlinear Effective Stress Method at Paks 
NPP, Hungary. In: EGS XXVII General Assembly, Nice, France, 2002.04.21-2002.04.26. 
Paper 4033 
Györi, E. et al. (2011) Earthquake induced subsidence and liquefaction studies for Paks site, 
Acta Geod. Geoph. Hung., Vol. 46(3), pp. 347–369 DOI: 10.1556/AGeod.46.2011.3.6  
Halbritter, A. et al. (1993a) Dynamic Response of VVER-440/213 PAKS Nuclear Power Plant 
to Seismic Loading Conditions and Verification of Results by Natural Scale 
Experiments. In: Godoy A, Gürpinar editors, Proceedings of the SMiRT-12 Conference 
Seminar No. 16 on Upgrading of Existing NPPs with 440 and 1000 MW VVER type 
Pressurized Water Reactors for Severe External Loading Conditions. Vienna, Austria, 
1993.08.23-1993.08.25. Vienna: IAEA, pp. 534-568. 
Halbritter, A. et al. (1993b) Structural Dynamic Response of the Primary System of the 
VVER-440/213 PAKS NPP due to Seismic Loading Conditions. In: Godoy A, Gürpinar 
editors, Proceedings of the SMiRT-12 Conference Seminar No. 16 on Upgrading of Existing 
NPPs with 440 and 1000 MW VVER type Pressurized Water Reactors for Severe External 
Loading Conditions. Vienna, Austria, 1993.08.23-1993.08.25. Vienna: IAEA, pp. 569-582. 
Halbritter, A., et al. (1994) “Requalification of the dynamic behavior of the primary system 
of the VVER 440/213 at Paks”, 9th European Conference on Earthquake Engineering, August 
27- September 2, 1994 Vienna, Austria 
IAEA (1993) IAEA-TECDOC-724, Probabilistic safety assessment for seismic events, IAEA, 
Vienna, 1993, ISSN 1011-4289 
IAEA (1995a) A Common Basis for Judging the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants Built to 
Earlier Standards, INSAG-8, Vienna, 1995, ISBN 92-0-102395-2 
IAEA (1995b) Seismic evaluation of existing nuclear facilities, SMiRT-13 post-conference 
seminar No. 16, Proceedings of the SMiRT 13 Post Conference Seminar No. 16, Iguazu, 
Argentina, August 21 - 23, IAEA, Vienna 
IAEA (1995c) Consultant Meeting on the Advisability of an Automatic Seismic Scram 
System in Nuclear Power Plants, 3-5 April 1995, Vienna, Austria 
IAEA (2000a) Benchmark Study for the Seismic Analysis and testing of WWER Type NPPs, 
IAEA TECDOC 1176, IAEA, Vienna, October, 2000, ISSN 1011-4289  
IAEA (2000b) Safety Standards Series No NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, 
Safety Requirements, IAEA, Vienna, ISBN 92–0–101900–9 
 
Seismic Safety Analysis and Upgrading of Operating Nuclear Power Plants 
 
121 
IAEA (2002) Safety Standards Series NS-G-3.3, Evaluation of Seismic Hazards for Nuclear 
Power Plants, IAEA, Vienna, 2002 
IAEA (2003a) Safety Reports Series No. 28, Seismic Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Power 
Plants, ISBN 92–0–101803–7 
IAEA (2003b) Safety Standards Series NS-G-1.6, Seismic Design and Qualification for 
Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA, Vienna, 2003 
IAEA (2003c) Safety Standards Series No NS-G-2.10 Periodic safety review of nuclear power 
plants: Safety Guide, IAEA, Vienna, 2003, ISBN 92-0-108503-6 
IAEA (2007) Preliminary Findings and Lessons Learned from the 16 July 2007 earthquake at 
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, 2007, IAEA, Vienna, Available from: 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2007/kashiwazaki-kariwa_report.html 
IAEA (2009a) Safety Standards Series No NS-G-2.13 Evaluation of seismic safety for existing 
nuclear installations international atomic energy agency, Vienna, 2009,  
IAEA (2009b) Safety Standards Series No NS-G-2.15, Severe Accident Management 
Programmes For Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Guide, IAEA, Vienna, 2009, ISBN 978–
92–0–112908–6 
IAEA (2010) Specific Safety Guide, Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear 
Installations, Safety Standard Series No. SSG-9, IAEA (2010), ISBN 978–92–0–102910–2 
IAEA (2011) Safety Reports Series No 66, Earthquake Preparedness and Response for 
Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA, Vienna, 2011, ISBN 978–92–0–108810–9 
INPO (2011) Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Station, INPO 11-005, November 2011, Available from: 
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/reports/speci
al-report-on-the-nuclear-accident-at-the-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-station  
Kassawara, R.P. (2008) Seismic Margins Assessment, IAEA Workshop on The Effects of Large 
Earthquakes on Nuclear Power Plants, June 21, 2008, Kashiwazaki City, Japan 
Katona, T. (1995) Description of the ASTS at NPP Paks. In: Advisability of an Automatic 
Seismic Trip System (ASTS) in Nuclear Power Plants: RER/9/035, IAEA, Vienna, 
Austria, (1995), pp. 64-78. 
Katona, T. (2001) Seismic Safety Evaluation and Enhancement at the Paks Nuclear Power 
Plant. In: Workshop on the seismic re-evaluation of all nuclear facilities: workshop proceedings, 
Ispra, Italy, 2001.03.26-2001.03.27. 
Katona, T. (2003) Seismic upgrading of Paks NPP, International Symposium on Seismic 
Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Facilities, IAEA, Vienna, 2003. Paper IAEA-CN-106/51.  
Katona, T. (2010) Options for the treatment of uncertainty in seismic probabilistic safety 
assessment of nuclear power plants, Pollack Periodica 5:(1) pp. 121-136. (2010) 
Katona, T. (2011) Interpretation of the physical meaning of the cumulative absolute velocity, 
Pollack Periodica, Volume 6, Number 1/April 2011, pp. 9-106 
Katona, T. and Bareith, A. (1999), Seismic Safety Evaluation and Enhancement, at The Paks 
Nuclear Power Plant. In: Proceedings of the OECD/NEA Workshop on Seismic Risk, 
 
Nuclear Power – Practical Aspects 
 
122 
NEA/CSNI/R(99)28. Tokyo, Japan, 1999.08.10-1999.08.12. Paris: Nuclear Energy Agency, 
Paper III-3. 
Katona, T. et al. (1992) Experimental and Analytical Investigation of PAKS NPP Buildings 
Structures. In: Proceedings of the Tenth World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 
Madrid, Spain, 1992.07.19-1992.07.24. Rotterdam: A.A.Balkema, pp. 1609-1618. 
Katona, T. et al. (1993a) Dynamic Analysis of VVER-440 Nuclear Power Plant for Seismic 
Loading Conditions at PAKS. In: Kussmaul K F (editor) 12th International Conference on 
Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology (SMiRT-12). Stuttgart, Germany, 1993.08.15-
1993.08.20. Elsevier - North-Holland, pp. 229-234. Paper K08/4.  
Katona, T. et al. (1993b) Structural dynamic response of the primary system of the VVER 
440/213 Paks NPP due to seismic loading conditions, SMiRT-11 Conference Seminar 
No.15, Upgrading of Existing VVER 440 and 900 Type PWR for Severe Loading Conditions, 
IAEA, Vienna, 23-25 August 1993 
Katona, T. et al. (1994) Requalification of the dynamic behavior of the primary system of the 
VVER-440/213 at PAKS. In: Duma G (editor) Proceedings 10th European Conference on 
Earthquake Engineering, Vienna, Austria, 1994.08.28-1994.09.02. Rotterdam: Balkema, pp. 
2839-2845.(ISBN:90-5410-528-3 (set) 
Katona, T. et al. (1995a) Time versus frequency domain calculation of the main building 
complex of the VVER 440/213 NPP PAKS. In: Riera JD (editor), Transactions of the 13th 
international conference on structural mechanics in reactor technology (SMiRT-13). Porto 
Alegre, Brazil, 1995.08.13-1995.08.18. Porto Alegre: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande 
do Sul, pp. 187-192. Paper K032. Division K: Seismic analysis and design, vol. 3 
Katona, T. et al. (1995b) Earthquake design of switchgear cabinets of the VVER-440/213 at 
Paks. In: Riera J D (editor), Transactions of the 13th international conference on structural 
mechanics in reactor technology (SMiRT-13). Porto Alegre, Brazil, 1995.08.13-1995.08.18. 
Porto Alegre: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, pp. 435-440. Paper K073. 
Division K: Seismic Analysis and Design 
Katona, T. et al. (1999) Dynamic Analysis and Seismic Upgradings of the Reactor Cooling 
Systems of the VVER-440/213 PAKS 1-4. In: 15th International Conference on Structural 
Mechanics in Reactor Technology (SMiRT 15). Seoul, South Korea, 1999.08.15-1999.08.20. 
Paper K11/3. 
Kennedy R. P. and Ravindra M. K. (1984) Seismic fragilities for nuclear power plant risk 
studies, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 79, 1984, pp. 47–68, 
KTA (1990) Design of Nuclear Power Plants against Seismic Events; Part 1: Principles, 
(Auslegung von Kernkraftwerken gegen seismische Einwirkungen; Teil 1: Grundsätze), 
Kerntechnische Ausschuss, KTA-Geschaeftsstelle c/o Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz 
(BfS), Willy-Brandt-Strasse 5, 38226 Salzgitter, Germany 
Masopust, R. (2003) Seismic Verification Methods for Structures and Equipment of VVER-
Type and RBMK-Type NPPs (Summary of Experiences), Transactions of the 17th 
International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology (SMiRT 17), Prague, 
Czech Republic, August 17 –22, 2003, Paper # K07-3 
 
Seismic Safety Analysis and Upgrading of Operating Nuclear Power Plants 
 
123 
McGuire, R. K., Silva, W. J. and Kenneally R. (2001) New seismic design spectra for nuclear 
power plants, Nuclear Engineering and Design, 203 (2001), pp. 249-257 
NEA (1998) Status Report on Seismic Re-Evaluation. NEA/CSNI/R(98)5. OECD Publications, 
2, rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France 
Nomoto T. (2009) Report on the Integrity Assessment of Structures, Systems and 
Components of the KK-NPP by the JANTI Committee, paper presented at 20th 
International Conference on Structural Mechanics In Reactor Technology, Dipoli Congress 
Centre, Espoo (Helsinki), Finland, August 12, 2009 
NRC (1956) 10Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and 
Utilization Facilities, U.S. NRC, Available from: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/cfr/part050/, last update 2012 
NRC (1980) Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Nuclear Plants, Unresolved 
Safety Issue (USI) A-46,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 1980. 
NRC (1983) PRA Procedures Guide, NUREG/CR-2300, U.S. NRC 1983 
NRC (1991) Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of 
External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, NUREG-1407, May 1991.  
NRC (1997a) Pre-earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Post-
earthquake Actions, Regulatory Guide 1.166, (1997) 
NRC (1997b) Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event, Regulatory 
Guide 1.167, (1997) 
NRC (1997c) "Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes", Regulatory Guide 
1.12, Revision 2, U.S. NRC, March 1997 
NRC (2000) Resolution of Generic Safety Issues: Item D-1: Advisability of a Seismic Scram 
(Rev. 1) (NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1–33), last reviewed, March 
2011, Available from: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec2/d01r1.html  
NRC (2007) Regulatory Guide 1.208 A Performance-Based Approach to Define the Site-
Specific Earthquake Ground Motion, U.S. NRC, March 2007 
NRC (2010) Results of Safety/Risk Assessment of Generic Issue 199, "Implications of 
Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States 
on Existing Plants", U.S. NRC, September 2010, Available from: 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1002/ML100270582.html  
NRC (2011) Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima 
Lessons Learned, SECY-11-0137, October 3, 2011 
Prassinos, P.G., Ravindra M.K., Savay, J.D. (1986) Recommendations to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission on Trial Guidelines for Seismic Margin Reviews of Nuclear 
Power Plants, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-4482 
Richner M., et al (2008) Comparison of PEGASOS results with other modern PSHA studies, 
OECD/CSNI-Workshop on Recent Findings and Developments in PSHA Methodologies and 
Applications, Lyon, April 7-9, 2008, pp. 573–591. 
 
Nuclear Power – Practical Aspects 
 
124 
Seed, H.B. and Idriss I.M. (1971) “Simplified Procedure for Evaluating Soil Liquefaction 
Potential,” Journal of the Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, Vol. 97(SM9), pp. 1249-
1273, American Society of Civil Engineers, 1971. 
Seed, H.B. and Idriss I.M. (1982) Ground Motions and Soil Liquefaction During 
Earthquakes, Monograph Series, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, University 
of California, Berkeley, CA, 1982. 
SQUG (1992) Generic Implementation Procedure for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power 
Plant Equipment, Rev. 2, SQUG, 1782, 1992 
Tokimatsu, K. and Yoshimi Y. (1983) “Empirical Correlation of Soil Liquefaction Based on 
SPT – Value and Fines Content,” Soils and Foundations, Vol 15(4), pp. 81-92, Japanese 
Society of Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering, 1983. 
Tóth, L., Győri E. and Katona T.J, (2009) Current Hungarian Practice of Seismic Hazard 
Assessment. In: OECD NEA Workshop: Recent Findings and Developments in Probabilistic 
Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) Methodologies and Applications: Workshop Proceedings, 
Lyon, France, 2008.04.07-2008.04.09.pp. 313-344. Paper NEA/CSNI/R(2009)1 
